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T his report seeks to evaluate theeffectiveness of the processes of
implementation of the Mahatma Gandhi
National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme in Karnataka and recommend
specific steps that could improve these
processes. The issues that arise relate to the
processes involved in the worker seeking
work, the process of providing that work,
the consequences of that work for the rural
economy and society, and the processes
involved in enabling and monitoring the
scheme.
In addressing these issues we need to
pay special attention to the diversity of the
state. Karnataka consists of parts that have
very different histories, varying agro-climatic
conditions, and diverse agrarian systems. In
order to capture this diversity we divided the
state into five regions: the Malnad and
Coastal districts; Southern Karnataka; North-
Western Karnataka; North-Eastern
Karnataka; and the Tribal belt.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the study looked at both the
enabling processes within government and the
impact on the rural economy, it needed
information from two different sources:
information on and from the official
machinery, and data about the households in
the villages. The data about the functioning
of the official machinery was collected
through a qualitative survey. The second set
of data from households in the villages was
collected through a multi-stage stratified
cluster sample, where the village was treated
as a cluster of households. The details of the
sample are given in Chapter 1.
GETTING WORK
The awareness of the MGNREGS is
very uneven. The Northeast presents a
picture of very low levels of awareness, but
with this awareness concentrated among
those who are most likely to need the
MGNREGS. The Malnad and Coastal
districts region, as well as the South, present
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much higher levels of awareness, but this
awareness is not the greatest among the
more deprived sections of these regions. The
Tribal region presents an average picture
with awareness levels close to the state
average, with significant levels of awareness
among the Scheduled Tribes and the
Scheduled Castes. The Northwest presents the
most worrisome picture with the overall
awareness levels being only marginally
above the Northeast and this awareness is
not the highest among the economically and
socially backward groups.
The number of job cards per 100
households across regions broadly follows
the patterns in awareness. The regions with
the higher awareness are predictably the
regions with the greater number of job cards
per 100 households. It must be pointed out
that the picture of job cards that emerges
from our survey is different from the one
that emerges from the official website of the
MGNREGS. In all the regions our survey
comes up with a lower estimate of the job
cards per 100 households, with the gap being
very large in Northeast and Northwest
regions and quite significant in the Tribal
region. The differences between the two
surveys are too large to be explained in
terms of sampling error alone. Also sampling
errors would tend to be spread equally across
all regions, whereas there is a sharp
variation in the margin of difference between
the northern regions and the Malnad and
Coastal Districts region. We cannot rule out
the possibility of over-reporting of job cards.
Indeed, officials in some of these regions
pointed to the problem of fake job cards that
get recorded in the official data. And official
data itself records very high levels of job
cards having different numbers but the same
name of the head of the household.
The fact that a household has a job card
does not necessarily mean that any member
of that household has ever worked under the
MGNREGS. A third of the households in the
Tribal region and around a fifth of the job
card holders in the other four regions have
not had a single day’s employment under the
MGNREGS. In this study we treat only those
who have actually worked as the labour
beneficiaries of the scheme.
The transaction costs of getting
employment under the MGNREGS are
concentrated at two levels: getting
information and getting a job. The
transaction costs also appear to be built into
the procedures as they are practiced on the
ground. In most regions when workers
approached the gram panchayat for work
on their own they were told to come back in
a group of 10 or 20 workers. The time taken
to put together such a group as well as the
delays in payments are the major
transaction costs the worker has to pay in
order to get work under MGNREGS.
These transaction costs ensure that while
the poor do benefit from the MGNREGS, the
poorest in the village community are not
always the main beneficiaries of the scheme.
With the exception of the Northeast the labour
beneficiary households are greater among
those who belong to the asset class just above
the poorest.
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PROVIDING WORK
The operation of the MGNREGS is
expected to provide employment in works
that address causes of chronic poverty such
as drought, deforestation and soil erosion.
The processes through which the Act is
implemented are also designed to strengthen
grassroots democracy. The case for
looking at MGNREGS in the context of
decentralization is particularly strong in
Karnataka. The state has been a pioneer in
the process of decentralization since the
1980s. These institutions have found it easier
to gain political legitimacy than to gain
economic strength. The substantial funds
provided under the MGNREGS empowered
the gram panchayats economically.
A striking feature across all regions
was the distance that exists between the gram
panchayat and the gram sabha. Ideally the
elected gram panchayat members should
interact closely with the gram sabha, which
is the general body of the all members of
the villages under the jurisdiction of the
gram panchayat. The MGNREGS also
requires the gram sabha to be directly
involved in the functioning and the
monitoring of the scheme. This requirement
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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is typically met by calling the stipulated
number of meetings of the gram sabhas. But
these meetings are sparsely attended.
The immediate consequence of the
disconnect between the elected gram
panchayat members and their constituents
is on the shelf of projects. The MGNREGA
envisages the shelf of projects to be worked
on under the scheme to result from the active
involvement of the gram sabhas, the gram
panchayats, the taluk panchayats and the
zilla panchayats. In reality the gram sabha
has very little role in deciding the projects
or the priority of the projects across all the
five regions, with only minor variations.
Typically the poorly attended gram sabhas
came up with, at best, an incomplete list that
was later completed at the gram panchayat
meeting. There were cases of lists decided in
the gram sabha being modified in the gram
panchayat.
The relative irrelevance of the gram
sabhas ensured that the choice of projects
was negotiated between the members of the
gram panchayat. The gram panchayat led
choice of projects was not without its
successes. But our qualitative survey did
come up with some pointers to other issues
involved in the choice of projects and their
implementation.
The unevenness in the quality of work
was quite evident. There were cases where
very rudimentary work was taken to be
sufficient. There was also sufficient evidence
throughout the state that the choice of
beneficiaries could be skewed by social and
political factors. There were signs in several
places of the elite capture of specific
MGNREGS projects. And the negotiations
within the gram panchayat over the choice
and priority of works also ensured that the
process of implementation of the
MGNREGS was not always without the
influence of local political considerations.
The choice of projects is also
complicated by the provision that allows
several groups of workers to work on their
own land. This is an extremely useful
condition to help the poor develop their own
land. But there is the question of whether
the labour is used for creating assets that
would improve the quality of land over the
long term, or simply as a labour subsidy in
their regular agricultural activities. This
distinction can be overlooked in the case of
the very poor where a labour subsidy may
itself be justified. But there are signs that
the beneficiaries of this condition were not
always the poorest.
The need to use the MGNREGS
generated labour in other government
schemes has been more widely discussed and
the state government has emphasised such
convergence. On the ground the results are
mixed. In the Northwest and the Tribal
regions, officials state there is no
convergence, and there is little evidence of
it found. In the Northeast officials insist there
is no convergence but there are projects of
the Forest Department that have been carried
out with MGNREGS labour. In both the
South region and the Malnad and Coastal
Districts region there is much more
enthusiastic support for convergence. In the
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South there are claims of having worked out
a complete convergence with the sanitation
programme and in the Malnad the claims
were of convergence with the watershed
programme. Such convergence however
raises its own questions relating to the
distribution of costs. In the Malnad and
Coastal Districts region funds from the
watershed project were only tapped when the
material required exceeded what was
permissible under the labour material ratio
of the MGNREGS. This also raises issues of
whether the target of the watershed
programme was suitably raised to account
for the resources taken from the MGNREGS.
CONSEQUENCES OF WORK
AGRICULTURE
In evaluating whether the MGNREGS
in Karnataka has created assets that
improve the productivity of land, the simple
answer would be positive. Check dams,
irrigation canals, wells and other such assets
should all have had a positive impact. Those
benefitting from these projects too were also
enthusiastic in their assessments of the
positive impact of these assets.
The difficulty arises when we try to
quantify the benefit so as to be able to decide
whether the projects generated the most
productive assets possible. Since the
construction of these assets have many
dimensions, a great deal would depend on
the aspect we focus on. While some assets
like an irrigation canal would have an
immediate impact, others, especially some
of those related to dry land agriculture could
take longer to take effect. And since the
MGNREGS in most districts in Karnataka
had been in place for less than three years
when this study was conducted, it may be
too soon to look for precise quantitative
assessments.
What must be said, however, is that
there are a number of elements that go into
the creation of assets under the MGNREGS
that may constrain the benefits of the
Scheme. First, in the choice of projects so
far the focus has been on those that relate to
a single gram panchayat. While the formal
processes that have been laid out allow for
projects involving more than one gram
panchayat, in reality such projects are rare.
This ensures the MGNREGS projects cannot
tap any economies of scale that may be
available. Second, the choice of projects is
typically first made informally at the gram
panchayat and then checked at the taluk level
to see if fits into the list of permissible
projects. This process does not pay sufficient
attention to the relative productivities of
competing projects. Thus while the impact
of MGNREGS on agricultural productivity
is very likely to be significantly positive,
there is reason to believe that it is not always
as beneficial as it could be.
An employment guarantee scheme can
affect the availability of labour for
agriculture both directly and indirectly. The
direct effect is when the scheme offers a wage
rate that is higher than that available in
agriculture at the same time. The indirect
effect is that the wage rate offered in the
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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scheme is available to workers even when
the workers do not actually work in the
MGNREGS. This then becomes the floor
wage rate below which workers will not be
available for work.
These factors however only come into
play when there is other work available at
the time when the workers decide to look
for MGNREGS work. In all the five regions
by far the most common answer was that
no other work was available, with this being
the response of 99 percent of the
beneficiaries in the South and over 90
percent in the two northern regions as well.
It is only in the better-off Malnad and
Coastal Districts region that a fourth of the
beneficiaries said they had other options,
and even here 16 percent were those who
said the other options were in their own
farms or business.
For those who have the choice, the
wages earned in MGNREGS were
generally well below that available in
agriculture or other wage labour. This was
true for male workers in all the regions
with the agricultural wages being nearly
twice the earnings from MGNREGS in the
Northeast. For female workers too
agricultural wages and the earnings of
other daily wage labour were higher than
the earnings from the MGNREGS in three
of the five regions. It is only in the Malnad
and Coastal Districts region and the South
region that this was not the case. The
ability of the MGNREGS to directly draw
labour away from agriculture was
therefore quite limited.
CHRONIC POVERTY
Given the fact that addressing chronic
poverty is one of the stated goals of the
scheme, it would be reasonable to expect
that a greater proportion of the chronic poor
are beneficiaries of the scheme when
compared to other sections of society. The
picture from the ground does not however
suggest that this is the case in Karnataka.
Other than in Northeast the proportion of
beneficiaries among the chronic poor is less
than the proportion of beneficiaries among
the others in the rural community.
The impression of the chronic poor
having to meet higher transaction costs than
others is strengthened by the earnings from
the MGNREGS reported by the beneficiaries.
In three of the five regions of the state the
earnings of the chronic poor from the
MGNREGS is significantly lower than that
of those who are not among the chronic poor.
Even in the more developed areas, such as
the Malnad and Coastal Districts region,
where the earnings of the chronic poor are
the highest when compared to other regions,
the earning of others from the MGNREGS
is greater. And in the two regions where there
is no significant difference between the
earnings of the chronic poor and the others
– the Northeast and the Tribal regions – the
actual earnings are much lower than that
specified under the MGNREGS.
OTHER EFFECTS
It is sometimes suggested that the
MGNREGS will have an impact on
migration from the villages to the cities. By
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offering rural workers work in the village it
will reduce the need for workers to go to the
city to seek employment. The results failed
to confirm the expectation that MGNREGS
reduces migration. On the contrary there
may even be case to argue that the
beneficiaries of the MGNREGS were more
inclined to migrate.
One of the major macroeconomic
effects of the schemes under the MGNREGA
is believed to be the purchasing power it
generates, not just from the amount directly
spent but also through, what economists call,
the multiplier. The multiplier from
MGNREGS payments was quite significant.
Quite predictably the poorest region in
Karnataka – the Northeast – spends the
highest proportion of income from
MGNREGS on food. The expenditure from
MGNREGS income in other regions
sometimes reflects the characteristics the
region is commonly identified with. The
fact that the only region spending a
significant amount of MGNREGS income
on education is the Malnad and Coastal
Districts region is quite consistent with the
strides that region has made in this field.
What is more disconcerting is the relatively
high levels of expenditure on health in the
Tribal region.
Men and women workers reported
significant differences in the wages earned
for MGNREGS work in all five regions of
Karnataka. These differences went up to
nearly Rs 20 in the Malnad and Coastal
Districts region and Rs 18 in the Tribal
region. But the gender difference in both
agriculture and other unskilled daily wage
work was substantially greater than that
prevailing in the MGNREGS. Even in the
areas reporting substantial gender
differences in MGNREGS earnings, the
differences in agriculture and other unskilled
daily wage work were far greater. The norm
that women should account for at least a
third of the person days worked was met in
all the five regions.
THE PROCESSES
Discussions at the zilla panchayats,
taluk panchayats and gram panchayats give
a distinct impression that the creation of
awareness about the MGNREGS is
generally not very high on the list of priorities
of the officials. As a result the levels of
awareness were typically determined outside
the government machinery. Regions with
long traditions of political awareness,
particularly the Malnad and Coastal
Districts region, also had very high levels
of awareness of the MGNREGS. Conversely,
regions with relatively limited successes in
the past in the mobilization of rural workers,
particularly the Northeast and the Northwest
regions, had very little awareness of the
scheme. Interestingly, even in these low
awareness regions the districts with the
active involvement of Non Government
Organizations had a noticeably higher level
of awareness.
A recurring theme in the
implementation of the scheme was the
informal processes on the ground that were
later formalized in the MIS. This was true
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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for the issue of job cards, getting work, and
for the implementation of projects. For
instance, acknowledgement slips for those
who applied for job cards were rarely issued,
ensuring that there was no independent record
of how many workers actually applied for a
job card. This left open the possibility of job
cards being issued in the names of those who
did not apply. Indeed, we cannot completely
rule out the possibility of job cards being
issued to non-existent individuals.
The labour demand is then made
through varying rule-of-thumb calculations.
In some cases these calculations are based
on the job cards issued. In other cases,
it is simply a projection based on the
current year’s progress, with the overall
MGNREGS budget of the current year
being taken as given, and 60 percent of that
figure taken as the labour expenditure.
Both these processes have their limitations
as there are reasons to doubt the
genuineness of the number of job cards, and
the labour material ratio is also not always
maintained.
The processes of implementation have
a number of dimensions of which two appear
to be in need of early attention: the
procurement of materials, and the facilities
provided to workers. There were several
indications of the specific steps required by
the formal process to procure material not
being followed.
The workers are also required to be
provided with a number of facilities. In the
work sites that this team visited, there were
few indications of these facilities. The general
pattern appeared to be for the workers to
take care of themselves, bringing even their
own water.
The emphasis on Social Audits in the
MGNREGS is reflected in the number of
audits being carried out. These audits are
typically carried out as per the requirements.
But there are reasons to doubt their
effectiveness. The most significant of these
reasons is that there is little public
involvement in these audits.
RECOMMENDATIONS
AWARENESS AND TRANSACTION COSTS
The levels of awareness are uneven
across different regions. It would be useful
to build on the empirical fact that within
the two northern regions with very low levels
of awareness, the district which has an active
presence of a Non Government Organization
has a relatively better awareness.
It is recommended that a portion
of the Administrative costs of the
MGNREGS in Karnataka be used to
support advocacy Non Government
Organizations working in the
backward and low awareness districts
of the state. The NGO should be
mission driven rather than fund
driven. This support can be linked to
performance. The criteria for
performance should include
attendance at gram sabhas, the number
of job cards, and jobs created. Ideally,
each NGO should be given a small
area so as to ensure better focus.
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JOB CARDS
The process of issuing job cards
appears to lack adequate scrutiny. Not only
are the number of job cards listed in some
of the regions very high, but the
government’s owns process of verification
has found lakhs of job cards that have a
different number but the same name of the
head of the household.
It is therefore recommended that a
separate registry be created in each
gram panchayat to issue job cards.
This body will not have as its member
any serving member of the gram
panchayat. It  will  have one
representative of each of the ward
sabhas in that gram panchayat. It
will  be administered through an
independent non-government agency
that will  create a network of gram
panchayat level registries in each
district. This gram panchayat level
registry can then issue the job
cards based on verif ication by the
member from each ward sabha. The
computerisation of this process at
the taluk level will help prevent the
issue of second cards to the same
household.
PLACE OF THE CHRONIC POOR IN THE
SCHEME
The current methods of targeting the
very poor are not always effective. Using
the BPL card dilutes the benefits to the
poorest as this card is also available to others
who may be poor but are not the poorest.
Our survey also suggests that using the BPL
card as a basis for targeting the poor does
not guarantee that all the poor will be
covered.
On the basis of previous
experience projects should be
identified that tend to employ the
chronic poor. Such projects should be
given priority.
DIFFERENTLY ABLED
Standardised piece work criteria can
discriminate against the old, and other
differently abled workers. This dilutes the
guarantee of work.
It is therefore proposed that a
separate list of activities be notified
taking into account the abilities of
individuals. Differently abled
individuals can then be given work
in line with their abilities.
CONVERGENCE AND THE AVAILABILITY OF
JOBS
In order to enable convergence
between government programmes all the
departments that have projects identified
in a particular gram panchayat could be
asked to state their demand for labour in
advance. Depending on the number of
workers asking for work the gram
panchayat secretary could inform the
department at the beginning of each week
about the availability of labour for that
week. While this approach will improve the
availability of jobs, it runs two risks. First,
additional MGNREGS funds could go into
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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meeting targets that are already provided
for. Second, more popular schemes could
crowd out the funds needed to remove the
bottlenecks to development, particularly in
dry land areas.
It is therefore recommended that
the government based on inputs from
decentralized institutions first identify
the bottlenecks to development in each
taluk in the state. It can then list the
other state and central schemes that
are best suited to remove these
bottlenecks. These schemes can then
provide to the local gram panchayats
their weekly requirements of labour.
And the gram panchayat secretary
should inform those carrying out the
project locally about the availability
of MGNREGS workers each week.
Schemes that use MGNREGS labour
should have their targets suitably
raised.
WORKING ON OWN LAND
The MGNREGS allows the
underprivileged to work on their own land.
This benefit is granted to specific groups
including the beneficiaries of land reforms.
In many cases this could result in
MGNREGS funds being used where the
farmers would have been able to use their
own labour or even hire labour. Such a
subsidy would only be justified on two
grounds: one it helps the very poor and it
contributes to food production.
It is therefore recommended that
the option of working on their own
farms only be given to those growing
food crops. The very poor can be
exempted from this condition.
WORK ON PRIVATE LAND WITH PUBLIC
BENEFIT
A major area of concern in Indian
agriculture has been dry land farming. The
technologies for dry land farming are
designed for the entire watershed. A farm
pond can be built at the lowest point in
the watershed, thereby improving the
availability of water to areas around it.
This process faces two important
bottlenecks. The pond could be on the
private land of one farmer while the
benefit would be to others. This would
require a mechanism whereby the farmer
whose land becomes a farm pond is
compensated by the others. The second
bottleneck is that no single farmer would
find it viable to make the investment for
the entire watershed. The resources
available under the MGNREGS could be
used to fill in this viability gap.
It is therefore recommended that
the MGNREGS allows work on
private land for specif ic watershed
projects, such as the building of a
farm pond. This must however only
be allowed when there is a clear lease
mechanism whereby a farmer whose
land is taken for such an asset  is
compensated by the others in that
watershed. It is also essential that
all the members of the watershed opt
for such a scheme.
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SHELF OF PROJECTS
In practice, the gram panchayat
typically comes up with a set of projects
and the line department officials only
decide whether it is feasible. Taluk
off icials act as the clearing house,
deciding whether the projects are among
those that are permissible. As the list of
permissible projects is broad and can be
interpreted even more broadly, a wide
range of projects can go through. This
process does not pay much attention to
the effectiveness of individual projects in
removing the local  bott lenecks to
development.
I t  i s  there fore  recommended
that  a f ter  the  government  has
worked out the l is t  of  bott lenecks
for  the  deve lopment  o f  each
predominant ly  rura l  ta luk in  the
state ,  the  Line  Departments  can
work out  the  spec i f ic  pro jects
required to remove the bottlenecks.
The gram panchayat can then be told
that  at  l east  one  in  every  two
projects should be from this sharply
focused l ist .
LIST OF PERMISSIBLE PROJECTS
It is recommended that the larger
list of permissible projects is also
made taluk specific. Thus each taluk
would have two lists: one of the
specific projects required to remove
bottlenecks, and another larger list
of permissible projects that are locally
relevant.
AGRICULTURE
The projects under the scheme would
be particularly useful if they generate
investments that individual farmers do not
find viable. For example, a project may be
beneficial to a group of farmers, but each
one of them may not find it viable to invest
in it. To the extent that it improves the overall
quality of resources in agriculture, it would
be a viable MGNREGS project.
It is therefore recommended that
specific land improvement projects
covering the land of more than one
farmer be given top priority,
especially in dry land areas. They
could be included in the list of
projects that would remove
bottlenecks to development.
NON-LABOUR BENEFICIARIES
The beneficiaries of the MGNREGS
are primarily the labour employed in the
projects, but the individuals benefiting from
the projects typically gain much more.
There is a possibility of some projects
benefiting just a few at great expense. It is
also possible that the same households
benefit repeatedly from MGNREGS
projects. This leads to a distortion in the
distribution of the benefits of the projects
under the scheme.
It is therefore recommended that
the gram panchayat maintains a
record of the number of households
benefitting for every Rs 10,000 spent
on a project under the MGNREGS. It
should distinguish between the direct
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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beneficiaries of the scheme, such as
those who benefit from the irrigation
provided by a well, and the indirect
beneficiaries such as those benefiting
from forestry. A work having only
indirect benefits would have to have
many more beneficiaries, say, three
times the beneficiaries of a competing
work with direct beneficiaries. When
clearing a project the Taluk Panchayat
must try to ensure that the number of
households benefiting from money
spent on a project is high, and the
number of repeated beneficiaries from
MGNREGS projects is low.
DEMAND FOR WORK
The current process of assessing the
labour budget is quite arbitrary. In order for
the scheme to be true to the spirit of
guaranteeing work to every worker, it is
necessary to ensure that the demand for work
is recorded whenever it exists. Ideally, this
would be done by finding out from every
household with a job card, their requirements
of labour for the week. This information
collected over a year would provide a better
basis to project the demand for work in the
next year. This measure could also be adjusted
to take into account factors like a drought.
It is therefore recommended that
15 person days of MGNREGS labour
per month in each gram panchayat
be devoted to finding out the weekly
labour demand from each household.
This exercise will have the added
benefit of increasing awareness of the
scheme. The individual playing this
role could also help the Ombudsperson
keep track of the working of the
scheme. The record of the demand for
work will also provide authentic
account of not just the magnitude of
the demand but also its seasonality.
DELAY IN PAYMENTS
A major reason cited for the delay in
payments across regions is the measurement
of work done. It may be more effective to
have the measurements taken locally. This
does raise the possibility of error, or worse.
But other methods could be used to check
wrong doing.
It is therefore recommended that
the measurement of work done be
carried out at the gram panchayat
level. The line department officials
could carry out random surprise
checks to find out the accuracy of these
measurements. Disciplinary action
could be taken against the gram
panchayat officials if the error is more
than 10 percent.
It is also recommended that an
easily accessible mechanism should
be set up to provide compensation for
delays in payment.
SOCIAL AUDIT
Across Karnataka the social audits
are held regularly, but their very purpose
is defeated by the extremely low levels of
popular interest. For this system to work
to any degree it is essential that the
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attendance at social audit gram sabhas
improves.
It is therefore recommended that
if an NGO is appointed in a district
for awareness of the MGNREGS and
another individual given 15 person
days of MGNREGS work to collect
labour demand information, the social
audit coordinator must work in close
coordination with them to improve
the attendance at the social audit
gram sabhas.
MONITORING
It is recommended that the
monitoring of the scheme be done not
only in terms of the process but also
in terms of outcomes. The outcomes
in terms of jobs would be the number
of households that have gained
employment in the scheme. And the
outcomes in terms of the assets
created would include the number of
beneficiaries of those assets as well
as some technical indicator of the
quality of that asset.
QUALITY OF INFORMATION
It is recommended that a detailed
review be carried out of the
procedures being followed at the gram
panchayat level to record the work
under the MGNREGS on the official
website.
FACILITIES FOR LABOUR
It is recommended that each
gram panchayat have a pedal-driven
three-wheeler designed to provide
drinking water, medical aid for
emergencies, and if possible, a
temporary shade that can be easily
set up and dismantled. The work of
the driver of the pedal driven three-
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T he Mahatma Gandhi NationalRural Employment Guarantee
Act is, arguably, the most important official
intervention into the rural economy in India
over the last decade. Its emergence as a fall-
back employment source is designed to
make a significant difference to livelihood
security in rural India. In the process the
Act also envisages being a growth engine
for the rural economy. The guarantee of a
hundred days of employment a year for a
rural household is designed to substantially
increase purchasing power, and may have
played a role in limiting the impact of the
global recession on the Indian economy. Its
emphasis on the creation of productive assets
should help offset the substantial deficits that
have been noticed in the past in public
investment in agriculture. The provisions of
the Act also provide for a significant
initiative in social transformation. There are
specific measures to improve the economic
conditions of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes and other disadvantaged
groups. It stipulates that at least a third of
the beneficiaries should be women. And by
putting in place an elaborate system of
monitoring and evaluation of a decentralised
operation, the implementation of the
provisions of the Act are also expected to
transform rural administration.
In order to implement this very
substantial agenda across the country, the
Ministry of Rural Development in the
Government of India has gone into
considerable detail in laying out the
processes that need to be followed at a
variety of levels, ranging from the Union
government down to the gram panchayat
and the worker. Well developed as these
processes are, their implementation across
the country is bound to be affected by the
diversity that prevails on the ground. The
socio-economic conditions in which the Act
is implemented vary to such an extent as to
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nature and functioning of the various
institutions, from those at the state level to
the gram panchayats, are very unlikely to
be uniform. The effects of the various assets
that have been developed, the purchasing
power generated, and the social
transformation initiatives are also likely to
vary. The relevant processes of
implementation, even when they are
consistent at the national level, have to be
functional in the local environment.
This report seeks to evaluate the
effectiveness of the processes of
implementation of the Mahatma Gandhi
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
in Karnataka and recommend specific steps
that could improve these processes. Such
an exercise necessarily involves comparing
the functioning on the ground to the
guidelines provided at the central and state
levels. The emphasis on effectiveness
however implies that the report cannot
confine itself to an investigation of whether
the norms are being followed. In addition
to this important element it has to also seek
insights into the impact of the scheme on
the rural economy. It was thus necessary to
understand the functioning of the
MGNREGS from the perspective of those
in the village economy. At the same time
the focus on practical recommendations led
us to pay considerable attention to the
views of those in the implementation
mechanism, from those involved in
designing the scheme at the central and
state levels, to functionaries at the district,
taluk and village institutions.
The rest of this introductory chapter
outlines the approach we used to achieve
the overall objective of this evaluation. We
begin with an outline of the specifics issues
that needed to be considered. We move on
to our efforts to address the diversity that
exists within Karnataka. We then specify the
method used in this evaluation.
THE SPECIFIC ISSUES
The National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act, (NREGA) was notified on
September 7, 2005. The Act was notified in
200 districts in the first phase with effect
from February 2, 2006 and then extended to
an additional 130 districts in the financial
year 2007-2008. The remaining districts were
notified under the NREGA with effect from
April 1, 2008. The first phase covered five
districts in Karnataka: Bidar, Chitradurga,
Davangere, Gulbarga and Raichur. The
second phase extended the scheme to six
more districts: Belgaum, Bellary,
Chikmagalur, Hassan, Kodagu and
Shimoga. The rest of the state was covered
in the third phase.
The objective of the Act is to enhance
livelihood security in rural areas by
providing at least 100 days of guaranteed
wage employment in a financial year to
every household whose adult members
volunteer to do unskilled manual work. It
aims to create a strong social safety net for
the vulnerable groups by providing a fall-
back employment source, when other
employment alternatives are scarce or
inadequate. Through the process of providing
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES 17
employment on works that address causes
of chronic poverty such as drought,
deforestation and soil erosion, the Act seeks
to strengthen the natural resource base of
rural livelihood and create durable assets
in rural areas. It further seeks the
empowerment of rural poor through the
processes of a rights-based law and to
provide a model of governance reform based
on transparency and grassroots democracy.
The official guidelines for the Act
identify its salient features as:
“i) Adult members of a rural
household, willing to do unskilled
manual work, may apply for
registration in writing or orally
to the local Gram Panchayat.
ii) The Gram Panchayat after due
verification will issue a Job Card.
The Job Card will bear the
photograph of all adult members
of the household willing to work
under NREGA and is free of cost.
iii) The Job Card should be issued
within 15 days of application.
iv) A Job Card holder may submit
a written application for
employment to the Gram
Panchayat, stating the time and
duration for which work is
sought. The minimum days of
employment have to be at least
fourteen.
v) The Gram Panchayat will issue
a dated receipt of the written
application for employment,
against which the guarantee of
providing employment within 15
days operates
vi) Employment will be given within
15 days of application for work,
if it is not then daily
unemployment allowance as per
the Act, has to be paid. Liability
of payment of unemployment
allowance is of the States.
vii) Work should ordinarily be
provided within 5 km radius of
the village. In case work is
provided beyond 5 km, extra
wages of 10% are payable to
meet additional transportation
and living expenses
viii) Wages are to be paid according
to the Minimum Wages Act 1948
for agricultural labourers in the
State, unless the Centre notifies
a wage rate which will not be less
than Rs. 60/ per day. Equal
wages will be provided to both
men and women.
ix) Wages are to be paid according
to piece rate or daily rate.
Disbursement of wages has to
be done on weekly basis and
not beyond a fortnight in any
case.
x) At least one-third beneficiaries
shall be women who have
registered and requested work
under the scheme.
xi) Work site facilities such as
crèche, drinking water, shade
have to be provided.
THE ISSUES
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xii) The shelf of projects for a village
will be recommended by the
gram sabha and approved by the
zilla panchayat.
xiii) At least 50% of works will be
allotted to gram panchayats for
execution.
xiv) Permissible works
predominantly include water and
soil conservation, afforestation
and land development works.
xv) A 60:40 wage and material ratio
has to be maintained. No
contractors and machinery is
allowed.
xvi) The Central Government bears
the 100 percent wage cost of
unskilled manual labour and 75
percent of the material cost
including the wages of skilled
and semi skilled workers.
xvii) Social Audit has to be done by
the Gram Sabha.
xviii)Grievance redressal mechanisms
have to be put in place for
ensuring a responsive
implementation process.
xix) All accounts and records relating
to the Scheme should be
available for public scrutiny.”1
There is however some scope for
flexibility around these guidelines. State
governments are expected to evolve their
own National Rural Employment Guarantee
Schemes which, while being required to be
consistent with the national operational
guidelines, offer the state governments the
option of introducing more detailed norms
to ensure the effective implementation of the
provisions of the Act.  In addition, the
Government of India has itself been open to
reconsidering specific norms. It has, for
instance, now decided that the schemes based
on the Act will pay a real wage rate of Rs
100 (that is, the rate of Rs 100 will be
regularly revised to take into account
inflation).
The operation of the Act through these
guidelines generates seven key
stakeholders: wage seekers, gram sabha,
panchayat raj institutions (especially the
gram panchayats), Programme Officer at
the block level, District Programme
Coordinator, State government, and the
Union Ministry of Rural Development.
These stakeholders relate to each other
through specific processes reflected in Chart
1. The process begins with workers in a
village seeking work from the gram
panchayat. The gram panchayat together
with the programme officer at the taluk
office prepare a shelf of projects which is
cleared by the zilla panchayat. The bulk of
these projects are implemented through the
gram panchayat. These works have a series
of effects on the village economy and
society, from increasing purchasing power
and creating productive assets, to providing
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES 19
support for women and other
disadvantaged sections of society. The entire
process is carried out under the scheme
designed by the state government in line
with the guidelines laid down by the
Government of India. The Central
Government has also been known to
occasionally directly study the working of
the scheme in some areas.
The processes involved in
implementing the MGNREGS are, broadly
speaking, of two kinds: those that are
concerned with enabling and monitoring the
scheme (the shaded boxes in the chart), and
those that are directly involved in the work
and the consequences of that work (the white
boxes in the chart). Addressing each of these
types of processes require a different focus.
An evaluation of the processes involved in
enabling and monitoring the scheme must
necessarily focus on the government
machinery and elected officials. At the same
time an evaluation of the activities of those
involved in the work and the consequences
of that work will be incomplete unless it is
seen in the context of the larger village
community. This raises methodological
issues that we will address in a later section
of this chapter.
When we look at the overall
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The first set relates to what can be seen
as the first stage with the worker seeking
work. This process is designed to begin in
the village where the job seekers demand
to be employed. The guarantee of a 100
days of employment per rural household
for all its adult members willing to do
unskilled manual work is to be made
effective through the provision of job cards
to households and then employment when
it is desired. At an administrative level the
challenge is to ensure deadlines for
providing job cards and jobs are met. And
this would have to be done without any
transaction costs. At the same time the
functioning of the scheme, and indeed its
very relevance, is dependent on the demand
for such a safety net. It is then important
to see how the village economy relates to
the MGNREGS; what is the role of the
scheme in the functioning of the village
economy. It is also necessary to gain
insights into the social impact of the scheme.
The specific issues in the process of
seeking work include:
1. What is the level of awareness
in the village of MGNREGS?
2. Are there transaction costs that
prevent potential beneficiaries
from getting job cards? Are there
certain poor who are not covered
by NREGS card? Are there any
other difficulties faced by
beneficiaries?
3. What is the place of the
beneficiaries of the MGNREGS
in the village community? Are
they, for instance, the poorest?
4. Does the process begin with the
worker demanding jobs or is it
initiated when a new work finds
funds? What mechanism has
been put in place to monitor
demand for work?
5. Are the norms set for the scheme
being followed in the issue of job
cards, payments, and other
elements of the scheme?
A second set of issues arises
simultaneously from the process of
providing work to those seeking it. The
demand for work under the MGNREGS
has to be matched with projects that can
generate the required jobs. The MGNREGS
seeks to not only provide jobs for those
who need them but to do so in a manner
that makes a fundamental difference to the
rural economy. This requires projects that
address not just a felt need in the village
but also fit into the larger economic
processes in the region. This makes it
imperative to take a closer look at the
generation of a shelf of projects and their
approval by the zilla panchayat. The
process of choosing projects and the
providing resources for them is itself not
independent of other social and political
processes at the village, taluk and district
level. The effect of these processes can be
seen in a number of areas, ranging from
the implementation of specific norms such
as ensuring the work is ordinarily within
a five kilometre radius of the village, to
the possibility of elite capture.
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The specific issues that need to be
addressed here include:
1. What are the social and political
processes through which the
labour budget is approved in the
gram sabha?
2. How is the shelf of projects
developed?
3. Are norms such as the stipulated
wage-material ratio followed?
4. What is the priority of works?
5. How is the site chosen?
6. How is the technical feasibility
carried out?
7. Are the delivery processes
effective?
8. Is there a possibility of further
simplification of rules and
regulations?
9. What steps can be taken to
improve the efficiency of the
scheme?
10. Is there a need to expand the
permissible work under
MGNREGS?
An intervention of the size of the
MGNREGS necessarily has consequences
that can transform the rural economy. The
third set of issues revolves around the
carrying out of the work and its
consequences. The consequences fall broadly
into three categories: the generation of
purchasing power, the creation of assets, and
the social consequences. The creation of
assets can in turn be evaluated in terms of
their productivity and in terms of the
beneficiaries of these assets. The social
consequences too would include those
affecting the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes and other vulnerable social groups,
as well as those influencing gender issues.
The specific issues that form a part of
this set include:
1. How is the money earned from
the MGNREGS spent? How has
it improved expenditure on
women and children,
particularly on their education,
better nutrition and health?
2. Is there a difference in the
tendency to migrate between
beneficiary households and other
households? Has MGNREGS
had an impact on migration?
3. Who are the direct beneficiaries
of the works that are carried out?
What is the distribution of these
beneficiaries across different
social groups?
4. Is there a gender difference in
earnings, and expenditure from
income earned under
MGNREGS?
The three sets of issues listed above
focus on the working of the scheme on the
ground. But the lessons learnt from those
exercises have to be addressed through the
processes through which the scheme is
implemented. The fourth set of issues thus
involves the processes that enable the
scheme and then monitor its progress. These
enabling and monitoring processes would
need to be seen not only in terms of those
directly involved in carrying them out, but
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also in terms of how they are perceived in
the village.
The specific issues that fall in this set
include:
1. What is the nature and
effectiveness of various social
audit mechanisms at the local
level?




3. Does the actual data maintained
at the gram panchayat tally with
MIS data?
4. Is the monitoring process put in
place effective?
5. Is the complaint redressal
mechanism in the state
adequate?
6. How far has the MGNREGS
been effectively combined with
other key development
programmes?
7. How effective has the vigilance
mechanism of the MGNREGS
been?
8. How has the MGNREGS
affected minimum wages in the
local labour market? Has there
been any impact on agriculture
due to MGNREGS?
THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY
An often underestimated challenge in
the analysis of policies in Karnataka is that
of the impact of the diversity of the state.
The state consists of parts that have very
different histories. It includes territories that
were once parts of princely states as well as
portions of different British presidencies.
Different parts of Karnataka also have
varying agro-climatic conditions. The
agrarian systems also vary quite
significantly across the state. This diversity
itself is widely acknowledged. But the impact
it has on an assessment of the state as a
whole has not always been given its due.
Not enough attention is paid to the fact that
when dealing with extremes the average
could provide a picture that relates to neither
end. And the multiple agrarian and other
systems across the different regions in
Karnataka can generate an average that does
not exist anywhere in the state.
Ignoring this diversity would be
particularly dangerous in studying the
MGNREGS as several elements identified
in the scheme have been known to vary quite
substantially. The proportion of landless
labour has been known to vary significantly
across regions of the state.2 This could have
an impact on the size of the labour force
that is in need of the MGNREGS. Again,
the divergence in agrarian systems had led
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to a varying impact of land reform
legislation.3 Since the beneficiaries of land
reforms are entitled to some special
treatment under the MGNREGS, this
variation too cannot be ignored.
It may be prudent then not to confine
ourselves to averages for the state as a whole,
but to also carry out an analysis of regions.
Our first task then is to arrive at a set of
regions which would capture much of the
variation across Karnataka.
Studies have shown that there are at
least three broad categorisations possible
of Karnataka’s agrarian systems.4 First, the
coastal districts were historically
dominated by tenancy. It is hardly
surprising then that these regions were the
major beneficiaries of land reform that
transformed the agrarian system. A
generation after the reforms were
implemented in the 1970s, this region is
characterised by a dynamic system of
farming for profit with a prominent place
for horticulture. This post-tenancy reform
economy can be expected to have its own
dynamics in the implementation of the
MGNREGS. Second, the districts that were
once a part of the princely state of Mysore
were, in general, dominated by peasant
agriculture. Landlessness and tenancy in
these districts in southern Karnataka were
among the lowest in the state. The tenancy
reform did not have too great an effect in
this region. Over the years, though, the
division of small peasant farms from one
generation to the next has resulted in a
large number of holdings becoming
unviable, leading to an increase in wage
labour. This region provides a picture of
the employment guarantee scheme working
in a peasant economy with an increasing
class of wage labour. The third broad
classification of agrarian systems is that
of northern Karnataka. Many parts of this
region particularly after the famine of the
late nineteenth century have been known
to historically have a large landless
agricultural labour class. This region
characterised by large tracts of dry land
agriculture was also known to have very
large farms. The combination of large dry
land farms and landlessness has ensured
that some parts of this region are not only
poor but also record high degrees of
inequality.
We may however need to go beyond
this simple three-fold classification. In some
cases the agrarian situation in the border of
a region is similar to that in the neighbouring
region. For instance, tenancy, somewhat
different in detail, from what prevailed in the
coastal districts was also existent in the
neighbouring Malnad region of old Mysore.
The Malnad region was also among the
earliest in Karnataka to record political
movements for land reform, such as the
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Kagodu sathyagraha.5 There is therefore a case
for linking the Malnad region with the coastal
regions rather than with old Mysore. This case
is further strengthened when we consider the
fact that the hilly terrain of this region is quite
different from the rest of old Mysore. Further,
given the size of the northern region and the
fact that there were serious political variations
between the districts that once belonged to the
Nizam’s Dominions and those that belonged
to the Bombay Presidency, we may be better
off treating Hyderabad-Karnataka and
Bombay-Karnataka as two different regions.
In addition, there are three contiguos districts
– Chitradurga, Bellary and Raichur – where
the tribal population is over one-sixth of the
total population (in fact, over 18 percent of
the population6). This feature merits treating
the tribal districts as a separate region,
especially since the MGNREGS places great
emphasis on the weaker sections of society.
Keeping this historical and agrarian
perspective in mind, as well as geographical
contiguity and the need to incorporate areas
like Kodagu, we could broadly divide the state
into five regions: Coastal Karnataka and the
Malnad, Southern Karnataka, North-Western
Karnataka, North-Eastern Karnataka, and the
Tribal belt. Table 1.1 presents the regional
classification used in the study.
Table 1.1: Regions in the Study
Region Districts
Northeast Bidar, Koppal, Gulbarga, Bijapur, Yadgir
Northwest Haveri, Belgaum, Gadag, Bagalkote, Davanagere, Dharwar
Tribal Raichur, Chitradurga, Bellary
Malnad Uttara Kannada, Chikmagalur, Shimoga, Udupi, Dakshina Kannada, Kodagu
South Chamaraja Nagara, Mandya, Chikkaballapura, Hassan, Tumkur, Kolar,
Ramanagara, Mysore, Bangalore Rural, Bangalore
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In order to confirm whether this
classification helps us explain the variations
in the economic profile of Karnataka, we
tested an analysis of variance (Anova) on
the per capita income of the districts in these
regions. Since our focus was on the rural
economies relevant to the MGNREGS, we
left out the two Bangalore districts. As the
Table 1.2 shows us, the variation explained
by these regions is far greater than the
variations within these regions. With a level
of significance of one percent, we can treat
this classification as meaningful for our
economic analysis.
A similar justification can be found in
the data related to MGNREGS as well. In
order to take into account the difference in
the size of the districts we need to adjust the
data on MGNREGS with an indicator of the
size of the district. This can be done by
dividing the number of job cards in each
district as listed in the official website of the
MGNREGS by the rural population of the
district in the 2001 Census. The distribution
of job cards in the year 2009-10 adjusted
for the population of the districts in the
Census of 2001 (that is, total job cards/
population) across the same five regions
follows a pattern close to that in the data on
district income. This regional classification
explains more of the variation in this data
than that within the regions. This result is
shown in Table 1.3.
With this regional classification
explaining the bulk of the variation across
districts in both income and job cards
adjusted for population, analysing the
secondary data available in Karnataka
across these five regions helps us summarise
the diverse conditions under which the
MGNREGS functions across Karnataka.
The diversity across the five regions is
revealed in their basic characteristics. Given
the dominant role that this classification
plays in explaining the variation in income
across districts, it is hardly surprising that
there is wide disparity between in income
from the poorest region, the Northeast, to
Table 1.2: Anova of per capita income
Mean Square F ratio Significance
Between Groups 1.863E8 4.361 Significant at 1%
Within Groups 4.272E7
Note: Bangalore and Bangalore Rural not included. Net per capita income (2007-08) current prices data obtained from Directorate of
Economics and Statistics, Bangalore
Table 1.3: Anova of jobcards adjusted for rural population 2009-10
Mean Square F ratio Significance
Between Groups 0.011 6.492 Significant at 1%
Within Groups 0.002
Source: Job cards data for FY10 obtained from MGNREGS website (Accessed September 24, 2010).
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the richest, the Malnad and the Coastal
districts. As can be seen from Table 1.4, there
is considerable disparity in the incomes of
the different regions. The richest region –
the Malnad and Coastal districts – has an
income that is 65 percent higher than that
of the poorest region, the Northeast of the
state. In keeping with our focus on the rural,
the data for the South does not include the
two Bangalore districts. What is striking is
the extent to which the Malnad and Coastal
Districts region is ahead of the other regions,
once we take Bangalore out of the picture.
Indeed, without Bangalore the South is the
second poorest region with a per capita
income that is above only that of the
Northeast.
One contributor to this difference in
income could be the fact that the richest
region has a more active and stable
occupation profile than the poorest. The
Malnad and Coastal Districts region appears
to have a demographic dividend over the
Northeast. Workers account for over three
percentage points more of the population in
the Malnad and Coastal Districts region than
they do in the Northeast. The contrast
between these two regions can also be seen
in the Census category of rural main
workers–those who were employed for six
months or more over the preceding twelve
months.  As can be seen from Table 1.5 the
poorest region, the Northeast, has the lowest
share of rural main workers to total workers.
Indeed, its share of rural main workers to
total workers is over 9 percent below the
Table 1.5: Proportion of rural main workers to total rural workers and
to rural population by region, 2001
Region Proportion of total Proportion of total women Proportion of rural main
workers to total  workers to total female workers to total workers
population population
Northeast 45.47 38.38 73.47
Northwest 48.99 39.87 78.92
Tribal 49.90 43.52 78.01
Malnad 48.79 38.38 82.60
South 50.87 40.14 79.07
Karnataka 49.09 39.87 78.60
Source: Tabulated from Census of India, 2001
In percent
Table 1.4: Net per capita income by region





Malnad and Coastal Districts 37343.17
South 24564.63
Source: Net per capita income (2007-08) current prices data
obtained from Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Bangalore
Note: The data on per capita income is the average of the districts
in the region. This data is not adjusted for the population of the
districts. The South does not include the two Bangalore districts.
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level in the most prosperous region, the
Malnad and Coastal Districts. The ranking
in the middle is not consistent with the
patterns recorded in income levels.
Going beyond the participation in the
workforce, to the occupation structure, it is
quite clear that the economic success of the
Malnad and Coastal Districts region has much
to do with its ability to move out of
agriculture. As can be seen in Table 1.6, by
2001 itself the proportion of rural main
workers in agriculture, i.e., either cultivators
or agricultural labour, was down to around
41 percent, compared to the overall state
average of around 71 percent. The share of
agricultural labour in the rural main workers
of this region was less than 15 percent.
But the ability to move out of
agriculture was not the only explanation for
the variations in income. The tribal region
had the highest share of agriculture among
the rural main workers. At nearly 82 percent
it was around 6 percentage points greater than
the corresponding share in the Northeast. But
as we have seen the income in the Tribal
region was over a third greater than that of
the Northeast. The share of rural main workers
in agriculture does not also indicate uniform
agricultural practices. The nature of agrarian
relations is also reflected in the division
between cultivators and agricultural labour.
In the Northeast, Northwest and Tribal
regions the dominant share of rural main
workers in agriculture was accompanied by
a substantial portion of the rural main workers
being agricultural labour. In these regions
agricultural labour accounted for around 35
percent of the rural main workers. In contrast
though around three-quarters of the main
workers in the South were involved in
agriculture the dominant feature was one of
peasant cultivation, with agricultural labour
accounting for less than 20 percent of the
rural main workers.
METHOD
The first choice that needed to be made
when working out the methodology of our
evaluation was to decide on the appropriate
unit of analysis. The two types of processes
Table 1.6: Proportion of cultivators and agricultural labourers to rural main workers
Region Proportion of cultivators Proportion of agricultural Proportion of rural main
to rural main workers  labour to rural main workers workers in agriculture
Northeast 41.04 34.97 76.01
Northwest 45.31 34.03 79.34
Tribal 44.73 37.02 81.74
Malnad 25.70 14.88 40.58
South 54.44 19.71 74.14
Karnataka 44.56 26.37 70.94
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we had identified earlier each had its own
appropriate unit of analysis. The processes
concerned with enabling and monitoring the
scheme called for a unit of analysis that was
consistent with administrative processes.
Since the focus at the administrative level
was on the gram panchayat it was this set
of villages that had to be taken as the
relevant unit of evaluation of the enabling
and monitoring processes at the grassroots
level. In evaluating the scheme at the level
of those directly involved in the work and
the consequences of that work within the
village, we needed to go a step further and
also focus on specific villages within a gram
panchayat. This helped us, for instance, to
identify who in the village actually benefited
from MGNREGS, and whether the place of
the beneficiary in the village economy and
community changed across different land
systems and regions of the state.
The study therefore required
information from two different sources:
information on and from the official
machinery, and data about the households
in the villages. The data about the
functioning of the official machinery was
collected by first canvassing an elaborate
Picture 1.1: Notice for MGNREGS in Dakshina Kannada
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questionnaire among the officials involved
in the implementation of the scheme at the
gram panchayat level. This included visits
to the sites of the projects. This was followed
by detailed discussions at the gram
panchayat level to understand the working
of the processes involved in the choice of
specific works.
The data from households in the
villages was collected through a multi-stage
stratified cluster sample. Our earlier
discussion on regional diversity in
Karnataka made it clear that the first stage
of this stratification had to be at the level of
the region. At the next stage we had a choice
between spreading our sample across a wide
range of villages within the region and
focusing in greater detail on fewer selected
villages. Since our focus was not just on the
beneficiaries of the MGNREGS but on the
effect of the scheme on the village as a whole,
it was felt that we could get greater insights
if focused on the village as a whole. This
focus allowed us to capture those who were
excluded from the functioning of the
MGNREGS, thereby allowing us to see
whether, and to what extent, some of the
poorest were excluded from the scheme. We
thus went in for an intensive sampling of
selected villages rather than a broad spread
across many villages.
The choice of the villages within a
region tried to capture the economic
variation within the region as well. It did so
by first choosing the economically strongest
and weakest districts in the region, going
primarily by the per capita income. This
exercise left out the predominantly urban
districts of Bangalore. Within these ten
districts we chose the taluks that had the
ratio of job cards to rural households that
was closest to the average for the district as
a whole. The data for job cards used in this
preliminary exercise was from the website
of the MGNREGS while the rural household
data was taken from Census of India, 2001.
Within that taluk, using data from the same
sources, we picked the gram panchayat
whose job cards to household ratio was
closest to the taluk average. Within that
gram panchayat we then picked two villages,
one among those with the highest number
of job cards and one among those with the
lowest. The list of districts, taluks and
villages is provided in Appendix 1. We then
took a sequential random sample of around
200 households distributed between the two
villages proportionate to size. The only
exception made was in the case of Shimoga
district in the Malnad region where the
terrain ensured that the villages were more
sparsely populated. In this district the
sample of around 200 households was
distributed across four villages, proportionate
to size. The total sample size was 2068
households in 22 villages across 10 districts
in the five regions. Since the size of the
sample for each region was approximately
the same while the size of the regions was
not, all the figures in this report have been
tabulated separately for each region. The
figures for Karnataka as a whole have
been arrived at as a weighted average of
the five regions, where the weights are the
THE ISSUES
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share of each region in the rural households
in the state, based on the Census of India,
2001.
The main section of the questionnaire
was then canvassed with the head of the
household.7 The questionnaire also had a
section designed to capture the expenditure
of the beneficiaries of the MGNREGS. This
section of the questionnaire was canvassed
directly with the beneficiaries. In order to
reduce the recall bias this section was only
canvassed on those who had worked in the
MGNREGS in the 12 months prior to the
canvassing of the questionnaire.
7 In cases where the designated head of the household was, for health or other reasons, not in a position to
answer the questions the questionnaire was canvassed with the next senior most member of the household.
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GETTING WORK
T he processes of the MahatmaGandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme
(MGNREGS) begin, strictly speaking, with
the worker seeking work. But this step is itself
only possible if the rural community,
especially the potential beneficiaries, are
made aware of the scheme.
AWARENESS
In order to make rural households
aware of the MGNREGS the official
machinery at both the district and the taluk
levels uses a variety of instruments from
announcing the scheme along with the
beating of drums to the printing of pamphlets.
In some parts of the state Non Government
Organizations have also stepped in.
The effects of these efforts have been
quite uneven.   Even as the rural areas of
some regions have very high levels of
awareness of the Scheme there are other
regions where the awareness is very low.  As
can be seen from Table 2.1 the awareness of
the existence of the scheme varies from a low
of less than 20 percent of the households in
the Northeast region to a high of 93 percent
in the Malnad and Coastal Districts region.1
And there is a broader regional pattern to it.
1 In order to capture awareness of any dimension of the scheme the questions checking the awareness of the
respondent extended beyond recognising the MGNREGS by name. For instance, a person not recognising
the scheme by name but being aware of job cards was taken as being aware of the scheme.
2
Table 2.1: Region-wise awareness of
MGNREGS








Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
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The northern regions are the worst off with
the awareness in the Northwest being, at 26
percent, only a little better than the Northeast.
In contrast, the South region and the
neighbouring Malnad and Coastal Districts
region have high levels of awareness. The
Tribal region to the east of the state has a
level of awareness somewhere between the
two extremes.  It must be noted that these
figures reflect a rather basic awareness, in
the sense of having heard of some aspect of
the scheme. Once we probe a little further
and ask the residents of the villages about
the basic features of the scheme – even
something as widely known as the
MGNREGS guaranteeing 100 days work per
household – the awareness drops across all
regions. This dip takes the awareness in the
Northeast and the Northwest to 10 percent.
Beyond these overall levels of
awareness there is the issue of the awareness
of the potential beneficiaries. It does not help
a great deal if the awareness is concentrated
in those sections of the village community
who would not be willing to carry out the
physical labour that is offered under the
MGNREGS. The relevant issue then is not
so much the overall levels of awareness but
the awareness among the potential
beneficiaries. This can only become apparent
when the levels of awareness are tracked in
the context of the village economy and
society. In tracking awareness levels across
different sections of the village, as indeed in
other issues in this report, we have classified
the households in three different ways in
order to capture varied aspects of the village
economy and society.
First, the agrarian dimension is seen
primarily through the land distribution
patterns. In the specific context of the
potential beneficiaries of the MGNREGS we
need to pay particular attention to the
landless and the small farmers, as they are
most likely to be in need of an employment
guarantee.
Second, we need to recognize that the
role of agriculture in the village economy
itself tends to vary. The economic momentum
and pressures of an agriculture dominated
by profit-seeking are likely to be quite
different from that of a village economy with
a more backward agriculture. The dominance
of agriculture itself does differ quite
significantly across villages. The relevant
economic classification to capture these
dimensions would move beyond land to look
at the set of assets owned by the household.
In order to capture the asset profile of an
household we first identified seven specific
assets that we believe best reflected the ability
of different classes of rural households to build
their assets, namely, cycle, motorcycle/scooter,
car, tractor, land, black-and-white television,
and colour television. We took the number of
these assets in each household and weighted
them according to the relative value of the
assets, on a scale of 100.2 The sum of these
2 The weights that were given were: cycle, 0.625; motorcycle/scooter, 6.25; car, 75; tractor, 100; an acre of
land, 2.5;  black and white television, 0.625; and colour television, 1.75.
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weighted assets was used as an indicator of
the asset level of the household. Our second
classification of households in the villages is
then on the basis of their asset indicators.
The third classification draws on the
continuing importance of caste in the village
community. The MGNREGS is particularly
sensitive to these social pressures, allowing
greater leeway to Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes, among other
disadvantaged groups, in the implementation
of the scheme. Our third classification
thus divides the village community into
Minorities, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
Tribes, and other castes.
When seen through these classifications
it is clear that the awareness levels, in
addition to varying across regions, are not
always uniform within each region as well.
Interestingly enough, in the region with the
least awareness, the Northeast, the awareness
among the landless is greater than the overall
average while that of the landed is below
the average. In the other four regions the
awareness among the landless is less than
the overall average. In these other regions
it is the small and medium landowners who
tend to have the most widespread awareness
of MGNREGS.
The pattern across the size classes of
land ownership is consistent with the
awareness levels across different asset groups
as well. In the Northeast the lowest asset
group of households, with none of the assets
we had listed, has an awareness level above
the average for the region as a whole. In all
the other regions the zero indicator level
groups have an awareness that is less than
GETTING WORK
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
Table 2.2: Region-wise awareness by land ownership
Northeast Northwest Tribal Malnad South
Land in Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware-
Acres ness of ness of ness of ness of ness of ness of ness of ness of ness of ness of
Scheme 100 days Scheme 100 days Scheme 100 days Scheme 100 days Scheme 100 days
Entitle- Entitle- Entitle- Entitle- Entitle-
ment ment ment ment ment
Landless 28.64 14.56 24.46 9.24 41.98 23.11 91.91 69.85 74.31 66.06
Less than or 12.36 6.74 28.16 11.65 63.1 39.29 93.23 80.21 77.54 71.12
equal to 2
More than 2 11.96 6.52 28.38 10.81 62.82 38.46 95 85 78.26 65.22
& less than
or equal to 5
More  than 5 4.35 0 22.22 11.11 54.84 38.71 87.5 87.5 28.57 28.57
& less than
or equal to 10
More than 10 7.69 3.85 16.67 8.33 46.15 38.46 100 100 100 100
Total 19.27 9.86 25.75 10.25 51.2 30.86 92.84 77.19 75.29 67.73
In percent
MGNREGS IN KARNATAKA
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES34
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
Table 2.3: Region-wise awareness by asset ownership
Northeast Northwest Tribal Malnad South
Asset Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware-
Indicators ness of ness of ness of ness of ness of ness of ness of ness of ness of ness of
Scheme 100 days Scheme 100 days Scheme 100 days Scheme 100 days Scheme 100 days
Entitle- Entitle- Entitle- Entitle- Entitle-
ment ment ment ment ment
0 31.34 14.93 18.57 8.57 32.63 15.79 87.1 58.06 60.27 52.05
More than 0 20.61 11.45 27.78 11.11 57.14 33.33 91.92 77.27 81.44 73.86
& less than
or equal to 5
More than 5 10.29 5.88 24.24 10.61 65.91 40.91 91.18 73.53 72.34 65.96
& less than
or equal to 10
More than 10 9.8 5.88 28.07 10.53 53.7 33.33 98.31 84.75 67.5 60
& less than
or equal to 20
More than 20 7.14 2.38 23.08 7.69 60.71 46.43 100 94.74 60 60
& less than
or equal to 100
More than 100 0 0 36.84 10.53 25.93 18.52 100 100 100 66.67
Total 19.27 9.86 25.75 10.25 51.2 30.86 92.84 77.19 75.29 67.73
In percent
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
Table 2.4: Region-wise awareness by caste and religion
Northeast Northwest Tribal Malnad South
Caste Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware- Aware-
ness of ness of ness of ness of ness of ness of ness of ness of ness of ness of
Scheme 100 days Scheme 100 days Scheme 100 days Scheme 100 days Scheme 100 days
Entitle- Entitle- Entitle- Entitle- Entitle-
ment ment ment ment ment
Minorities 42.42 21.21 31.43 7.14 34.78 17.39 95.83 62.50 100.00 100.00
Scheduled 39.64 20.72 34.21 5.26 59.26 33.33 87.27 70.91 82.19 75.34
Castes
Scheduled 10.53 10.53 29.41 14.71 67.69 44.62 66.67 58.33 80.39 72.55
Tribes
Other 8.79 4.03 22.48 11.24 45.23 28.14 94.76 80.42 69.87 61.92
castes
Total 19.27 9.86 25.75 10.25 51.20 30.86 92.84 77.19 75.29 67.73
In percent
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the overall average. In these regions the
awareness is greatest in the middle levels. It
is also interesting to note the awareness
levels among richer households. We would
expect the interest in these households about
the scheme to be quite low, and a declining
awareness as we move to the richer
households is clearly visible in the Northeast.
But this pattern is not as clear in other
regions. Indeed, in the Malnad and the
Coastal Districts region, the levels of
awareness increase as we move to the richer
households.
The awareness levels across different
social groups reflect a significant variation
not just across regions but also across
different sections of the underprivileged. The
awareness levels of the Scheduled Castes are
higher than the overall average in four of
the five regions. It is only in the Malnad
and Coastal Districts region, which has high
overall levels of awareness that the
awareness levels of the Scheduled Castes falls
below the overall average. In the case of
Scheduled Tribes the pattern is rather more
mixed. As is perhaps to be expected their
awareness is well above the overall average
in the Tribal region. The awareness of
Scheduled Tribes is also above the overall
average in the South and marginally above
the overall average in the Northwest region.
In both the highest awareness region of the
Malnad and the Coastal Districts as well as
the least awareness region of the Northeast,
it is well below the overall average.
JOB CARDS
The number of job cards per 100
households across regions broadly follows
the patterns in awareness. The regions with
the higher awareness are predictably the
regions with the greater number of job cards
per 100 households. The only change in the
ranking across regions is that the Northwest
is now the worst performing region,
exchanging ranking with the Northeast. But
as is to be expected there are those who are
aware of the scheme but do not see
themselves as potential labour beneficiaries.
The better-off households that are aware of
GETTING WORK
Table 2.5: Region-wise job cards and awareness
Number of job cards in household
Region No job cards One job card More than Awareness
one job card
Northeast 83.26 16.51 0.23 19.27
Northwest 91.00 8.50 0.50 25.75
Tribal 58.85 38.52 2.39 51.20
Malnad 51.72 47.48 0.80 92.84
South 53.55 46.22 0.23 75.29
Karnataka 66.52 32.84 0.61 56.33
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
In percent
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the scheme have no interest in doing the
physical labour that is offered under the
MGNREGS. Thus as the awareness grows
to levels where the bulk of the village
community knows of the scheme the number
of job cards does not keep pace. Our data
suggests that the proportion of households
with job cards tends to peak at just below
50 percent. In the South region where there
was 75 percent awareness, 46 percent of the
households had job cards, but as the
awareness reached 93 percent in the Malnad
and Coastal Districts region, the proportion
of households with job cards was only
marginally higher at 47 percent.
It must be pointed out that the picture
of job cards that emerges from our survey
is different from the one that emerges from
the official website of the MGNREGA. In
all the regions our survey comes up with a
lower estimate of the job cards per 100
households, with the gap being very large
in Northeast and Northwest regions and
quite significant in the Tribal region. In the
Northeast there is a difference of almost a
100 percentage points. The difference is also
very significant in the Northwest where it is
80 percentage points and even in the Tribal
region where there is a difference of almost
50 percentage points.
We could try to explain this difference
in terms of the data used by us to calculate
the ratio of job cards per 100 households in
the official website. We have taken the
number of job cards listed on the website
while the number of rural households is
taken from the 2001 census. The number of
rural households may well have increased
over the last decade, so that our calculation
is an overestimate of the number of job cards
per household. But if we take into account
the migration from the rural to the urban
any increase in the number of households is
unlikely to be of the magnitude to
fundamentally alter the patterns in the
regions where the difference is substantial.
It could also be pointed out that the NIAS
survey being based on a sample there will
be some error in its estimates. But here again
the differences between the two data sets are
too large for much of it to be explained in
terms of sampling error. It is also important
to note that the sampling error would tend
to be spread equally across all regions,
whereas there is a sharp variation in the
margin of difference between the northern
regions and the Malnad. Indeed, the
Table 2.6: Region-wise job cards per 100
households from MGNREGS website and
NIAS survey
Region Percentage of households
with jobcards








Source: Tabulated from data available at  http://nregalndc.nic.in/
netnrega/mpr_ht/employeementstatus_mpr.aspx?lflag=
local&state_code=15&page=S&month=Latest&fin_year=2010-
2011&state_name=KARNATAKA [Accessed on 11 March, 2011],
Census of India, 2001, and NIAS Survey, 2010-11
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difference between the official figures and
the NIAS estimates in the Malnad region
are small enough for much of it to be
explained by the sampling error. It would
then appear that the substantial difference
between the two estimates in the northern
regions and the significant difference in the
Tribal region could be caused by other
factors.
We cannot rule out the possibility of
over-reporting of effective job cards. Indeed,
officials in some of these regions pointed to
the problem of fake job cards that get
recorded in the official data. And the official
data on job cards with a different number
but the same head of household name
suggests that more job cards being issued
on the same name may not be a marginal
error. As can be seen in Table 2.7 the
phenomenon of job cards with a different
number but the same household name is
quite widespread across all regions. It may
be worth noting, though, that the
phenomenon is least in the Malnad and
Coastal Districts region which had the lowest
difference between the official figures and
the results of our survey.
The large number of job cards with a
different number but the same household
name in the official data, gives the
impression of many households having more
than one job card. But the NIAS survey
indicates that this pattern is not quite so
widespread.  As Table 2.5 told us, all regions
did have some households with more than
one job card, but the numbers were quite
small, going above the one percent mark
only in the Tribal region. It must also be
kept in mind that while the MGNREGA
allows for only one job card per household,
its definition of household is such that it is
possible to have more than one job card in
a household. In the Census definition of a
household, and the one used in our study, a
‘household’ is usually a group of persons
who normally live together and take their
meals from a common kitchen unless the
exigencies of work prevent any of them from
GETTING WORK
Table 2.7: Job cards with different number and same head of household name







Source: Tabulated from data available at
http://nregalndc.nic.in/netnrega/writereaddata/citizen_out/jcrVerification_15_local_1011.html and http://nregalndc.nic.in/netnrega/
mpr_ht/employeementstatus_mpr.aspx?lflag=local&state_code=15&page=S&month=Latest&fin_year=2010-2011&state_name=KARNATAKA
[Accessed on 31 March, 2011]
Note: We have assumed that the job cards with the repeated names are no longer included in the official number of job cards. The total job
cards used to calculate the percentage is therefore the sum of the total job cards listed in the website and the job cards with repeated names.
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doing so. While in the MGNREGA
guidelines a ‘Household’ mean a nuclear
family comprising mother, father, and their
children, and may include any person wholly
or substantially dependent on the head of
the family. Household will also mean a
single-member family. Thus two nuclear
families living together and sharing a
common kitchen would be treated as a single
household in the Census and in our study,
but in the MGNREGS they would be treated
as two households. Despite a broader
definition of a household our survey did not
find too many households with more than
one job card. It does seem quite clear that
while there is reason to believe there are
excess job cards in the various regions, as
suggested by the data on the MGNREGS
website, these cards are not in the hands of
the households.
TRANSACTION COSTS
The fact that a household has a job
card does not however necessarily mean that
any member of that household has ever
worked under the MGNREGS. There are a
number of households that have job cards
and have not worked even as single day
under the MGNREGS. A part of this
phenomenon could be explained by workers
picking up job cards in order to ensure they
can get a job if they need one in the future.
But the number of those with a job card who
have never worked under the MGNREGS is
not insignificant, suggesting that the problem
may also be one of their not being given
jobs. As can be seen from Table 2.8 around
a fifth of the job card holders have not had
a single day’s employment under the
MGNREGS in four of the five regions. And
in the Tribal region job card holders who
have not worked even one day goes up to
well above the one-third mark. It thus makes
sense in this study to treat only those who
have actually worked as the labour
beneficiaries of the scheme, rather than
assuming all job card holders benefit in
terms of employment.
Even among those who have worked
under the MGNREGS the number of days
Table 2.8: Region-wise job cards and work
Region Percentage of total Percentage of total Percentage of  households
households with households that have  with job cards where
job cards  worked at least one day    no one has worked
Northeast 16.74 13.53 19.18
Northwest 9.00 5.50 38.89
Tribal 41.15 32.06 22.09
Malnad 48.28 38.20 20.88
South 46.45 35.93 22.65
Karnataka 33.47 25.82 22.86
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES 39
worked in a year tends to fall well below
the 100 guaranteed days. As we can see from
Table 2.9, among the households that have
worked during the year preceding the study
the average number of days worked for the
state as a whole is only around 53 days and
there is considerable regional variation here
as well. The average days worked varies
from 35 days in the Tribal region to 70 days
in the Northwest. It is interesting to note that
in the Northwest very few houses benefit in
terms of getting a job under MGNREGS,
but the beneficiaries do get a substantial
number of days of work in a year.
The distribution of work among those
who have worked in the MGNREGS is also
very uneven. In order to capture this
unevenness we have used a variation of the
Gini coefficient that is usually used to
estimate income inequality. This has been
calculated under two conditions. In the first
we take the job card holders as the entire
population and calculate the Gini coefficient
to see how the person days of employment
are distributed among them. In the second
the same exercise has been carried out
treating those who have had at least one
day of employment as the entire population.
The high coefficients in Table 2.10 make it
quite clear that the unevenness in the
distribution of work is not insignificant. The
high coefficients among job card holders is
only to be expected when a fifth of them
have never worked. But it must be noted that
the coefficients among those who have
worked are also not low. It must be
remembered that some of this variation
would be the result of individuals in
households with job cards not being willing
to work. But if we make the possibly
reasonable assumption that the households
with job cards not having individuals willing
to work is spread evenly across all regions,
these coefficients could reflect the variation
in the difficulties in getting jobs.
These patterns suggest that the
transaction costs of getting employment
under the MGNREGS are concentrated at
two levels: getting information and getting
a job. The low levels of awareness in the
GETTING WORK
Table 2.9: Region-wise mean persondays
per household amongst beneficiary
households in the last one year







Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
Table 2.10: Region-wise gini coefficients of
person-days employed
Region Gini coefficients Gini coefficients
for households for households







Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
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Northwest and the Northeast regions ensure
that large sections of potential beneficiaries
in these regions face huge barriers to even
becoming available for employment under
the scheme. The complete lack of awareness
ensures that in such cases information is a
transaction barrier rather than just a
transaction cost, in the sense that even if a
worker were to be willing to meet these costs
from the wages offered under the
MGNREGS it may not be possible to
overcome this hurdle. In the regions with
the higher levels of awareness – the Malnad
and Coastal Districts region as well as the
South – information is clearly not a barrier.
The transaction costs in these regions would
appear to be concentrated in the process of
getting jobs after gaining a job card. This is
reflected in the fact that the South region
and the Malnad and Coastal Districts region
have the second and third highest Gini
coefficients for the distribution of person days
of employment among job card holders.
Indeed, among those who have had at least
a day’s employment, the South region has
the highest Gini coefficient for the
distribution of person days of employment.
The fact that the major barrier in the
Northeast, Northwest and Tribal regions is
information must not be taken to mean that
there is no difficulty for those who are aware
to get job cards. As can be seen from Table
2.11, in a state where there is generally little
difficulty in getting job cards, the Northeast
has six percent of those who are aware of
the scheme complaining about having
difficulty in getting job cards. Nearly a
quarter of the households that were aware
of the scheme also had individuals who had
been denied work or told that work was not
available. Interestingly, none of these
households felt it necessary to register official
complaints. It is also worth noting that the
Malnad and Coastal Districts region had the
least proportion of households that said that
they had been denied work, but had the
highest proportion of households that had
registered complaints. This may be no more
Table 2.11: Region-wise proportion of households who are aware of the scheme with
individuals who had difficulty in getting job cards, had work denied or
had registered complaints
Region Difficulty in getting Work / additional Registered
job card work denied complaints
Northeast 5.88 23.53 0.00
Northwest 0.00 7.77 0.97
Tribal 2.31 9.72 1.39
Malnad 1.14 2.57 4.86
South 0.91 4.26 0.00
Karnataka 1.64 8.21 1.16
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
In percent
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than a comment on the history of the
region’s political movements and the fact
that other regions clearly have very little
inclination to register their complaints.
When trying to identify the precise
nature of the transaction costs involved in a
job card holder getting a job there is
sometimes speculation that job card holders
may be expected to share their wages with
those giving them a job. This possibility
cannot be ruled out especially since, as we
shall see later, in some regions, the average
wage that MGNREGS workers said they got
was less than the official wage. But we must
also consider the possibility that the process
of giving jobs need not be based on a direct
monetary transaction. The monetary benefits
could take other less direct forms. The
decision to offer work to a particular
household could also be influenced by other
social relationships within a village.
There was also clear evidence of the
transaction costs being built into the
procedures that were practiced on the
ground, even if it did not form a part of the
MGNREGS guidelines either from the Rural
Development ministry at the national level
or the Rural Development and Panchayat
raj department in Karnataka. For instance,
often when workers approached the gram
panchayat for work on their own they were
told to come back in a larger group. In most
of the regions the minimum required was a
group of 10 workers, though it was not
unknown for gram panchayats to ask
workers to first form a group of 20 workers.
The time taken to put together such a group
was a transaction cost the worker had to
pay in order to get work under MGNREGS.
The worker did not also have any alternative.
The MGNREGA visualises an
unemployment allowance paid in cases
where workers demanding work cannot be
given work within a period of 15 days. But
the responsibility for this process lies with
the state governments. And Karnataka’s
recording in paying unemployment
allowance, as Table 2.12 tells us, is very poor.
Even if we ignore the difficulties in
recording demand for work and seeking
unemployment allowance, the fact that the
official data at the end of the year says no
unemployment allowance was paid in any
region tells its own story.
Another transaction cost in the process
of getting work under the MGNREGS and
getting paid for it lies in the substantial
delays in payments. The MGNREGS requires
that the payments must be made within 15
days of the work done. But this norm is not
GETTING WORK
Table 2.12: Unemployment Allowances for
the Financial Year 2010-2011
Region Unemployment Unemployment
allowance due allowance paid







Source: Tabulated from data available at
http://nregalndc.nic.in/netnrega/writereaddata/state_out/
unempall_15_local_1011.html [Accessed on 30 March, 2011]
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followed completely in any region. Even if
we give a margin for bureaucratic delays
and keep the target time taken for payment
as one month, there are significant delays
in all the regions. And the extent of delay
does also vary quite substantially between
regions. The worst offender Is the Tribal
region where three-fourths of the payments
are made two months or more after the work
is done and as much as 56 percent of the
payments are more than three months after
the work is done. What is even more
alarming is that the average time taken for
payment is over 7 months. The Northeast
also has over three-fourths of the payments
taking more than three months but the
extreme delays would appear to be relatively
rarer with the mean time taken for payments
being a little less than four months.
Comparatively speaking the most prompt
region is the South where 71 percent of the
payments are made within a month and the
mean time taken is just 1.8 months. The
Malnad and Coastal Districts region as well
as the Northwest region have the greatest
variation within them. While 52 percent in
the Malnad and Coastal Districts region are
paid within a month, 35 percent have to wait
more than three months and the average
time taken for payment is a little less than
four months. In the Northwest 63 percent
are paid within a month, but 26 percent have
to wait more than three months. And the
time taken beyond three months appears to
be quite high with the mean time taken for
payments being over four months.
PLACE OF THE BENEFICIARY IN THE
VILLAGE ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
These transaction costs ensure that
while the poor do benefit from the
MGNREGS, the poorest in the village
community are not always the main
beneficiaries of the scheme. With the
exception of the Northeast the labour
beneficiary households – those who have at
least one member who has worked at least
one day in scheme – are greater among those
Table 2.13: Region-wise delays in payment
Time taken for Payment
Region Less than or equal More than 1 month More than Mean delay
to 1 month and less than or 3 months in months
equal to 3 months
(In percent) (In percent) (In percent)
Northeast 22.35 14.12 63.53 3.88
Northwest 62.96 11.11 25.93 4.19
Tribal 24.07 19.75 56.17 7.35
Malnad 51.93 13.26 34.81 3.89
South 71.10 19.72 9.17 1.81
Total 53.93 15.92 30.15 3.57
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
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who belong to the asset class just above the
poorest. As can be seen from Table 2.14, this
group accounts for as much as three-fourths
of the beneficiary households in the South
region, more than half the beneficiary
households in the Malnad and Coastal
Districts region, and over a third in the Tribal
region and the Northwest. It is only in the
Northeast that the largest group of
beneficiary households – 56 percent of them
– belongs to the class owning none of the
assets in the list we used to calculate the
asset indicator. But even here the class just
above the poorest accounts for a third of
the beneficiary households.
This overall pattern is explained to some
extent by the fact that it is typically the asset
class just above the poorest that is numerically
dominant in the village. That however is not
the only factor at play. It is worth noting that
in all five regions the share of the beneficiary
households belonging to the asset class just
above the poorest is greater than the share of
this class among the population as a whole.
At the same time the share of the poorest
among the beneficiary households in four of
the five regions is below their share of the
population. It is only in the Northeast that
the share of the poorest among the beneficiary
households is substantially above the share
of this group in the population.
When we look at the place of the
beneficiaries within the agrarian system, the
pattern does change, but not by much. The
GETTING WORK
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
Table 2.14: Place of the beneficiary in terms of asset ownership
Northeast Northwest Tribal Malnad South
Asset Bene- All Bene- All Bene- All Bene- All Bene- All
Indicators ficiary ficiary ficiary ficiary ficiary
0 55.93 30.73 13.64 17.5 11.94 22.73 6.94 8.22 14.01 16.7
More than 0 33.90 30.05 40.91 40.5 36.57 30.14 54.86 52.52 74.52 60.41
& less than
or equal to 5
More than 5 5.08 15.6 22.73 16.50 27.61 21.05 15.28 18.04 5.10 10.76
& less than
or equal to 10
More than 10 5.08 11.7 18.18 14.25 14.18 12.92 20.14 15.65 4.46 9.15
& less than
or equal to 20
More than 20 0.00 9.63 0.00 6.50 8.21 6.70 1.39 5.04 0.64 2.29
& less than
or equal to100
More than 0.00 2.29 4.55 4.75 1.49 6.46 1.39 0.53 1.27 0.69
100
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
In percent
MGNREGS IN KARNATAKA
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES44
largest group of beneficiary households,
except in the Malnad and Coastal Districts
region is landless. As Table 2.15 tells us, this
group accounts for 80 percent of the
beneficiary households in the Northeast, and
well over half in the South. But much of this
dominance is explained by the fact that the
landless are, except in the Malnad and the
Coastal Districts region, the largest group
in the village. When seen in the context of
their numbers within the village it is only in
the Northeast and the South that the landless
households have a greater share among the
beneficiaries than they do in the population.
The MGNREGS is however by no means
the preserve of the landless. There are a
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
Table 2.15: Place of the beneficiary in land ownership
Northeast Northwest Tribal Malnad South
Land Bene- All Bene- All Bene- All Bene- All Bene- All
(in acres) ficiary ficiary ficiary ficiary ficiary
Landless 79.66 47.25 40.91 46.00 40.3 50.72 33.33 36.07 56.05 49.89
More than 0 11.86 20.41 36.36 25.75 26.12 20.1 52.08 50.93 40.76 42.79
& less than
or equal to 2
More than 2 8.47 21.10 18.18 18.5 23.13 18.66 13.19 10.61 3.18 5.26
& less than
or equal to 5
More  than 5 0.00 5.28 4.55 6.75 8.96 7.42 1.39 2.12 0.00 1.60
& less than
or equal to  10
More than 10 0.00 5.96 0.00 3.00 1.49 3.11 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.46
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
In percent
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
Table 2.16: Place of the beneficiary in terms of caste and community
Northeast Northwest Tribal Malnad South
Caste or Bene- All Bene- All Bene- All Bene- All Bene- All
community ficiary ficiary ficiary ficiary ficiary
Minorities 20.34 8.26 9.09 17.50 2.99 11.24 6.94 6.63 0.00 0.23
Scheduled 59.32 24.77 13.64 9.50 33.58 25.84 7.64 14.59 45.22 33.41
Castes
Scheduled 1.69 4.36 9.09 8.50 24.63 15.55 2.78 3.18 13.38 11.67
Tribes
Other 18.65 62.61 68.19 64.50 38.80 47.37 82.64 75.60 41.40 54.69
Castes
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
In percent
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significant number of landowners owning up
to five acres who have worked under the
scheme. This is particularly true of the
Malnad and Coastal Districts region, a
generation after its agrarian system was
transformed through land reforms. In this
region those owning up to five acres of land
account for as much as 67 percent of the
beneficiary households.
The caste and community profile of the
beneficiary households also points to the
rather different performance of the
MGNREGS in the Malnad and Coastal
Districts region. As can be seen from Table
2.16, the category of other castes (ie, the
forward castes and the backward castes
together),  account for 83 percent of the
beneficiary households, which is noticeably
more than the share of these castes in the
population. At the other end of the spectrum,
the share of the Scheduled Castes in the
beneficiary households is, at eight percent,
well below its share in the population. In
the Northwest too the share among the
beneficiary households of the forward and
backward castes taken together is a little
more than their share of the overall
population; but the share of the Scheduled
Castes in this region is also greater than their
share of the population. In this region it is
the share of the minorities among the
beneficiaries that is well below their share
of the population. In the other three regions
the share among the beneficiary households
of the forward and backward castes, taken
together, is significantly less than their share
in the population, and the share of the
Scheduled Castes is significantly above their
share of the population. As is to be expected
in the Tribal region the Scheduled Tribes
account for a quarter of the beneficiary
households and, together with the Scheduled
Castes, account for 58 percent of the
beneficiary households. The only region
where the minority communities have a
significant share is the Northeast where they
account for a fifth of the beneficiary
households.
*    *    *
The process of getting work thus
reveals some rather distinct patterns across
the five regions of Karnataka. The Northeast
region presents a picture of very low
awareness and participation in the scheme,
but it is the poorest in this region that are
the major labour beneficiaries of the scheme.
The transaction costs in this region are
concentrated at the level of information,
though the denial of work among those who
are aware of the scheme is the highest in
this region. The Northwest too presents a
picture of low awareness and low
participation, and its benefits do not even
accrue to the poorest. The transaction costs
here extend beyond the information barrier
to limiting the number of holders of job
cards who actually get work.  The Tribal
region is characterised by moderate levels
of awareness, job cards and getting work.
The beneficiaries here as well are poor but
not the poorest. While there are clearly
GETTING WORK
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transaction costs here, this region is close to
the average for the state. The South presents
a picture of rather high awareness and job
cards, but the transaction costs here appear
to be concentrated in the process of job card
holders actually getting work. The work is
distributed the most unevenly even among
those who have actually got at least a day’s
work. This contributes to the main
beneficiaries not being the poorest. It is the
Malnad and Coastal Districts region that
shows some rather different patterns. This
region has the highest awareness as well as
the highest number of job cards per 100
households. It would appear that in this
region that is known for its political and
other awareness, the transaction costs are
not as high as in some other regions in the
state. But the beneficiaries in this region are
not the poorest within the region. They are
typically small peasants belonging either to
the forward or the backward castes.
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PROVIDING WORK
T he significance of the guaranteeof 100 days of work for a rural
household every year has tended to
overwhelm some of the other dimensions of
the MGNREGA. The operation of the
Schemes in the states are expected to provide
employment in works that address causes
of chronic poverty such as drought,
deforestation and soil erosion. The processes
through which the Act is implemented are
also designed to strengthen grassroots
democracy. These other dimensions of the
Act cannot be treated as mere afterthoughts.
High food prices point to the growing crisis
in agriculture. The inability to take the
Green Revolution into dry land agriculture,
and the declining quality of the land in
irrigated agriculture, are not issues that can
be easily brushed aside. Similarly, as
democracy takes root, the emergence of
decentralized power structures are also not
easily ignored. A meaningful evaluation of
the provision of work under the MGNREGS
in Karnataka must then look not just at the
number of jobs created but also at the assets
created in the process, including the asset of
effective decentralization.
DECENTRALIZATION
The case for looking at MGNREGS
in the context of decentralization is
particularly strong in Karnataka. The state
has been a pioneer in the process of
decentralization since the 1980s. Its
decentralized institutions have been
transformed over the last three decades.  It
took the lead in the revitalization of
decentralized institutions during this period
by first setting up of a two-tier panchayat
raj system and then modifying it into the
present three-tier one. The reservation for
women in these institutions is among the
few cases in post-independence India of
setting up grassroots practices that national
institutions are now trying to follow. The
elections to the gram panchayats not being
3
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on the basis of parties is also an important
dimension of the decentralization process.
While individuals elected to the gram
panchayats may choose to align with one
party or another, the fact that they have
been elected independently of the party
allows them, if they so choose, to be guided
solely by the interests of their constituents
and not by party diktats. And these
institutions are now deeply entrenched in
the politics of rural Karnataka, as is evident
from their ability to function on a scale
their urban counterparts in the state have
found difficult to match.
The relevance of these dimensions of
the gram panchayats in Karnataka to an
evaluation of the MGNREGS lies in the fact
that these institutions have found it easier
to gain political legitimacy than to gain
economic strength. Their ability to raise
funds on their own is extremely limited. The
substantial funds provided under the
MGNREGS thus have the potential to
empower the gram panchayats
economically. It would be useful then to
begin our analysis of the process of providing
work under the MGNREGS in Karnataka
by first evaluating the economic strength
gained by the gram panchayat through the
Scheme and then get at least a glimpse into
how this economic strength interacts with
the decentralized political power.
The official data for the proportion of
expenditure in the MGNREGS carried out
by the gram panchayat suggests that these
institutions account for almost all the
expenditure under this Scheme. This can be
seen in the expenditure patterns of the
MGNREGS in Karnataka in 2009-10, the
last financial year completed at the time of
this study. With the exception of material
expenditure in the Malnad and Coastal
Districts region, the gram panchayat
accounts for more than 97 percent of the
labour and material expenditure in each of
the regions. Indeed, with the further
exception of material expenditure in the
South region, the gram panchayat accounts
for more than 99 percent of the expenditure.
Detailed discussions with officials at the
district, taluk and gram panchayat levels in
ten districts did not give us any reason to
challenge these figures.
It was also clear that in most regions
the beneficiaries were expected to bring their
own tools. A majority of the workers in all
the regions used their own tools. While the
beneficiaries using their own tools accounted
for more than half the workers in the
Northwest, it was typically at least three-
fourths of the beneficiaries, going up to 92
percent in the South region.
Table 3.1: Share of Gram Panchayat in
expenditure by region
Region Labour Material Total
Northeast 99.99 99.98 99.99
Northwest 99.98 99.06 99.61
Tribal 99.99 99.99 99.99
Malnad 99.99 82.21 93.72
South 99.98 97.36 99.16
Source: Tabulated from data posted at nrega.nic.in, [Accessed on
December 10, 2010]
In percent
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Discussions with officials and others in
villages in all the five regions did however
provide some insights into the factors
influencing these expenditures. A striking
feature across all regions is the distance that
exists between the gram panchayat and the
gram sabha. Ideally the elected gram
panchayat members should interact closely
with the gram sabha, which is the general
body of the all members of the villages under
the jurisdiction of the gram panchayat. The
MGNREGS also requires the gram sabha
to be directly involved in the functioning
and the monitoring of the scheme. This
requirement is typically met by calling the
stipulated number of meetings of the gram
sabhas. But these meetings are sparsely
attended. Some gram panchayats spend
resources on shamianas and chairs, but there
is little sign that this improves attendance.
Picture 3.1: A Gram Sabha in Ramnagara district
PROVIDING WORK
Table 3.2: Region-wise proportion of
beneficiaries using their own tools
Region                         Beneficiaries








Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
In percent
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This is evident from Picture 3.1 of the gram
sabha in a village in Ramanagara district.
The gram sabha had over five thousand
members. The role provided in the Scheme
for the gram sabha was thus largely treated
as a formality by both the gram panchayats
and the residents of the villages in its
jurisdiction.
The immediate consequence of the
disconnect between the elected gram
panchayat members and their constituents
is on the shelf of projects. The MGNREGA
envisages the shelf of projects to be worked
on under the Scheme to result from the active
involvement of the gram sabhas, the gram
panchayats, the taluk panchayats and the
zilla panchayats. This process is expected
to help integrate the technical and other
knowledge available at the larger bodies
with the requirements expressed at the gram
sabhas. In reality the gram sabha has very
little role in deciding the projects or the
priority of the projects across all the five
regions, with only minor variations. Typically
the poorly attended gram sabhas came up
with, at best, an incomplete list that was later
completed at the gram panchayat meeting.
There were even cases of lists decided in the
gram sabha being modified in the gram
panchayat. The reasons given for ignoring
the gram sabha was usually the greater
knowledge available at the taluk and zilla
panchayat levels.
In the more politically aware regions
like the Malnad and Coastal Districts too
the list is made before hand, though here
there is publicity for the gram sabha meeting
and more suggestions are invited. In addition
another week is given for suggestions of
more projects. But the prioritisation from
this large list is done by the gram panchayat.
Thus the effective list of projects is still
primarily determined by members of the
gram panchayat.  Working out the lists
independently of the gram sabha was termed
by officials in the Malnad and Coastal
Districts region as just a matter of
convenience.
The convenience of this process was
however not without its costs. The MGNREGS
allows for irrigation and other works on the
land of members of  the Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes, beneficiaries of Indira
Awaas Yojana and those below the poverty
line. But converting this potential into reality
would require these groups to have their voice
heard in the gram sabhas.  The gram sabhas
provide a forum where the underprivileged
have an opportunity to stake their claims.
With this forum being rendered ineffective,
these sections cannot always get the full
benefit of what the Act offers. This is reflected
in the cost of individual works on their lands.
This cost will necessarily be less than the cost
of major projects affecting a large number
of households. It is then no surprise that Table
3.3 tells us that the average cost of work on
their land is less than the overall average
cost of a work. But what is worth noting is
that in four of the five regions the average
cost of works on the land of the
underprivileged is well below the cost of land
development work on other land. In fact, in
the Tribal region the cost per work on the
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land of the underprivileged is less than a
fourth of the average cost of other land
development work. Interestingly, the only
exception to this pattern is the Northeast
region where the cost per work on the lands
of the underprivileged is greater than the
average cost of other land development
works.
The relative irrelevance of the gram
sabhas also ensured that the choice of
projects was negotiated between the members
of the gram panchayat. The interests the
gram panchayat members represented
evidently also tended to vary. While the
interests of their respective constituents were
the major consideration, other factors were
also taken into account. Informal discussions
pointed to the influence of members of other
elected bodies going right up to Members
of Parliament. And in some cases the
projects being chosen in a way that directly
benefited the panchayat member could not
be ruled out.
Indeed, one of the consistent differences
between the formal and informal discussions
at the village level was in the role of the
panchayat members in the implementation
of the projects. While the role of the
panchayat members found no place in the
formal discussions, the informal discussions
were full of examples of panchayat members
playing a role not very different from that of
contractors. Informally several projects were
pointed out as being carried out by the
panchyat members themselves, or, in the case
of the women members, by their husbands.
There were also stories of panchayat members
having played a role in the procurement of
materials. These practices, if true, would go
against both the letter and the spirit of the
MGNREGS. The MGNREGA does not allow
for contractors and the phenomenon of
panchayat members choosing personally
beneficial projects and then carrying them
out themselves which suggests a very high
degree of conflict of interests. But it must be
stressed that this study did not have the
resources to verify these casually made
charges. The possibility of these charges being
prompted by local factional and political
PROVIDING WORK
Source: Tabulated from nrega.nic.in, [Accessed on December 20, 2010]
Table 3.3: Region-wise average expenditure per work on selected
works under MGNREGS
Region Irrigation facility and other works Other land development All works
in SC/ST land or IAY/BPL land
Northeast 27138 22072 54428
Northwest 37400 96404 92466
Tribal 7773 33253 63468
Malnad 14788 31681 33551
South 16341 40144 58948
Total 20470 39373 60995
In rupees
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considerations cannot be ruled out. All that
is done here regarding such charges,
therefore, is to report what was heard, without
confirming or disputing the claims.
THE NATURE OF MGNREGS
PROJECTS
The gram panchayat led choice of
projects was clearly not without its successes.
The beneficiaries were typically, and
predictably, very happy with the effects of
these projects. And with good reason. Take
for instance the case of the farmer in the
generally dry land agriculture economy of
the Aurad taluk in Bidar district. This area
in the northern extreme of Karnataka is
known for being among the poorest in the
state. The well dug under the MGNREGS
next to this farmer’s landholding has helped
him convert this dry land into a sugarcane
farm. While the appropriateness of growing
sugarcane in this region could be a matter
of debate, there is no doubt that MGNREGS
has transformed the life of this farmer.
Similar anecdotal evidence of
beneficiaries being very satisfied with the
results of the MGNREGS is also available
from other parts of the state. A walk of one
Picture 3.2: Check dam in Chitradurga district
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and a half kilometres through fields in
Chitradurga district brings us to the check
dam in Picture 3.2. The check dam that
seems, to the untrained eye, to be well
constructed has helped raised water levels
in the lands of the neighbouring farmers. In
other regions too the beneficiary farmers
were quite effusive in their claims about the
increase in the water levels due to check
dams. In one case in Chitradurga district the
beneficiary farmer claimed the check dam
had led to the water level in his land rising
60 feet. Since he did not evidently have the
means to make such an assessment, this would
have to be taken as no more than an
indication of his appreciation of the
MGNREGS project.
Moving from anecdotal evidence to the
precise numbers of the benefit of specific
MGNREGS projects across the state can be
done at two levels. First, there can be an
engineering evaluation of physical quality
of the various assets. And second, especially
for assets related to improving the quality
of land, comparisons would have to be made
between the productivity of land before and
after the project. Collecting such information
for a representative sample of assets across
the state would provide us with a meaningful
assessment of the impact of the assets
created. Such information is of course not
currently available. But our qualitative
survey did come up with some pointers to
the issues involved in the choice of projects
and their implementation.
One aspect of the assets created that
becomes quite evident is the unevenness in
the quality of work. There are cases, such as
the one in the Northeast in the Picture 3.3,
where very rudimentary work is often taken
to be sufficient. The limited work done on
this land was officially recorded as the
creation of a bund. The case of the road in
the Tribal region in Picture 3.4 is, if
anything, even more glaring. Even to an
untrained eye it is evident that it is closer to
being a mud road rather than the cement
concrete road the official records claim that
it is. And it does not help that the informal
Picture 3.4: Road in Raichur district that is
said to be classified as cement concrete
Picture 3.3: Bund work in Bijapur district
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discussions suggest that this work was carried
out by a gram panchayat member.
There was also sufficient evidence
throughout the state that the choice of
beneficiaries could be skewed by social and
political factors. There were signs in several
places of the elite capture of specific
MGNREGS projects. Picture 3.5 is of a
house in the Malnad and Coastal Districts
region. The satellite dish outside the house
is an indicator of the class to which it
belongs. This household had got the benefit
of two MGNREGS projects in a single year.
One project was for an open well dug in front
of the house and the other was for an
irrigation canal to its land.
Picture 3.5: Household in Shimoga district which had two MGNREGS works in a year
Picture 3.6: Beneficiary of a well work in
Shimoga district
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES 55
Even when the bias in the choice of
beneficiaries was not so blatant, there could
be issues raised about the efficiency of the
MGNREGS investment. In Picture 3.6 the
well has made a significant difference to the
women in the households benefiting from it.
They had previously to walk six kilometres
for the drinking water the well now provided
them. But the number of beneficiaries was
rather limited. Officially five households
were said to benefit, but one beneficiary said
it was only two households. The efficiency
of this investment would depend on whether
there were other projects possible where there
would be a greater number of beneficiaries
from an asset as crucial as one providing
drinking water.
It is also possible that in areas of great
social inequality, the work done under the
MGNREGS reflects these differences. One
stark example of this possibility was the
construction of a drain in a village in the
Northwest region that can be seen in the
composite Picture 3.7. Not far from the
gram panchayat office a drain was
constructed, as seen in the image on the left,
which stopped once the row of concrete
houses ended and did not extend to the
poorer houses beyond that. What is more,
as can be seen in the circled portion of the
image on the right, the drain was constructed
in a way that would take its contents directly
to the area of the poorer houses. The
Picture 3.7: Completed drain work in Haveri district
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Secretary of the gram panchayat insisted
that the work was completed.
The negotiations within the gram
panchayat over the choice and priority of
works also ensure that the process of
implementation of the MGNREGS is not
always without the influence of local
political considerations. For instance, in a
village in the South region a mud road was
being constructed under the MGNREGS. The
road was however designed to pass through
land under the control of the ex-President
of the gram panchayat. The current gram
panchayat insisted that he had encroached
on the land, a fact that was predictably
disputed by the former president. As a result
the project in the picture is incomplete and,
as can be seen in Picture 3.8, the distance
of the road that has been completed shows
signs of deterioration.
The choice of projects is also
complicated by the provision that allows
several groups of workers to work on their
own land. This is an extremely useful
condition to help the poor develop their own
land. But there is the question of whether
the labour is used for creating assets that
would improve the quality of land over the
long term, or simply as a labour subsidy in
their regular agricultural activities. This
distinction can be overlooked in the case of
the very poor where a labour subsidy may
itself be justified. But there are signs that
the beneficiaries of this condition are not
always the poorest.
The choice of projects is thus closely
related to the local economic, social and
political conditions. Where these conditions
are unequal the projects could easily
consolidate the inequality, while in areas
that have undergone effective reform, the
distortions could be of a different kind. It is
hardly surprising then that the type of work
that dominates each region tends to be quite
varied.
TYPES OF WORK
The MGNREGS is designed in a way
that emphasises labour intensive projects. It
specifies that a 60:40 ratio has to be
maintained between expenditure on labour
and that on material. In addition, the Central
government’s financing is also such that the
state governments have an incentive to
encourage labour intensive projects. The
Central government pays 100 percent of the
wage cost of unskilled manual labour and
75 percent of material costs including the
wages of skilled and semi-skilled workers. This
did not however ensure that no capital
intensive projects could be taken up on the
ground. Officials argued that they were only
required to maintain the 60:40 ratio of labour
expenditure to expenditure on materials for
the panchayat as a whole and not in individual
cases. This allowed for specific capital
intensive projects as long as there were more
labour intensive projects to balance the
overall picture. And even with this
arrangement the official targets were not
always met. Table 3.4 tells us that in two of
the five regions – the Northwest and the Tribal
region – the target of ensuring 60 percent of
the expenditure was on wages was not met.
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When we look beyond the wage
material ratio to for information about the
specific types of works being carried out at
the MGNREGS in the different gram
panchayats, the easiest source is the official
website. It classifies the expenditure on
different types of works. During informal
discussions at the village level, however,
there were sometimes charges of the local
gram panchayat working on a project in one
area, say, laying of a mud road, and getting
it officially classified as another, say, land
development. We thus thought it prudent to
see the patterns of investment that were
revealed by the workers who had worked in
MGNREGS in the region. The proportions
we calculated were thus not of investment
but of labour days. These figures are not
strictly comparable with the patterns of
expenditure under MGNREGS. This is
particularly so since the ratio of the
expenditure on labour to the expenditure on
material was not identical in all cases, and
the ratio for the gram panchayat as a whole
was also not an easy task. With wide
variations possible in the labour material
ratio the proportions that emerge from an
analysis of expenditure are unlikely to be
identical to those that emerge from labour
days.
We then have the choice of either
looking at the official data on expenditure
on different activities or our data on the
distribution of MGNREGS labour across
different activities. To the extent that the
main focus of the MGNREGS is the labour
generated, the proportions calculated on the
basis of labour may be more relevant.
Generating this alternative set of data also
allowed us to capture categories that the
official data was not as easily forthcoming
on, such as the emphasis on horticulture.
The patterns that emerge from Table
3.5 reflect, among other things, the
conditions of agriculture in the different
regions. The poor infrastructure in the two
northern regions would appear to justify the
emphasis of these regions on mud roads. This
emphasis on roads comes down quite sharply
when we move to the regions known to have
better developed infrastructure, such as the
South or the Malnad and Coastal Districts
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Table 3.4: Region-wise percentage of expenditure on wage, material
and administration
Region Wage Material Administration
Northeast 63.72 35.61 0.68
Northwest 57.89 39.87 2.24
Tribal 55.27 43.13 1.59
Malnad 63.44 34.48 2.08
South 67.71 31.07 1.22
Karnataka 62.25 36.23 1.52
Source: Tabulated from data posted at nrega.nic.in, [Accessed on December 10, 2010]
In percent
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region. What is more striking though is the
prominent place of horticulture in the South
region and the Malnad and Coastal Districts
region. This activity is estimated to account
for a quarter of the jobs got under
MGNREGS in the South and nearly a third
in the Malnad and Coastal Districts.
The emphasis on horticulture in the
Malnad and Coastal Districts region gains
significance when seen together with the
patterns of work under the MGNREGS on
public and private land. For the state as a
whole a vast majority of the work is on
public land. This work on public land does,
and is indeed expected to, benefit the private
land owned by individual farmers in the
vicinity. It is also inevitable that the private
lands of some farmers are benefitted more
than that of others. But work done on public
land to create assets that benefit private land
differs from work done directly on private
land in at least one important way. The work
done on private land could be for recurring
agricultural practices rather than the
creation of a long-term asset. Indeed, even
if the work is officially stated to be for the
creation of a long-term asset, it would be
extremely difficult to monitor the work and
ensure no part of it goes into recurring
agricultural practices. And in cases where it
goes into recurring agricultural practices,
the MGNREGS wage would be no more than
a labour subsidy.
Table 3.5: Region-wise distribution of MGNREGS workers by nature of activity
  Region                                                                          Type of Work
Construc- Horticul- Minor Road Road Watershed Well Others
tion ture irrigation laying laying digging
(Kuchha) (Pucca) and
deepening
Northeast 0.00 4.65 1.16 54.65 0.00 0.00 32.56 6.98
Northwest 10.34 0.00 17.24 58.62 0.00 6.90 3.45 3.45
Tribal 7.10 0.00 2.96 31.95 1.18 30.77 23.08 2.96
Malnad 1.09 32.07 3.80 23.91 1.09 13.04 24.46 0.54
South 0.92 25.23 4.13 11.01 0.00 46.33 11.47 0.92
   Total 3.54 15.07 6.41 32.38 0.30 23.56 16.21 2.54
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
In percent
Table 3.6: Region-wise distribution
of MGNREGS workers by location
of activity
Region Other Own Public
private land land
land
Northeast 6.98 0.00 93.02
Northwest 0.00 0.00 100.00
Tribal 0.59 0.59 98.82
Malnad 1.63 26.09 72.28
South 0.46 2.75 96.79
Total 1.54 5.36 93.10
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
In percent
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WORK ON OWN LAND AND
OTHER PRIVATE LAND
The results of our quantitative survey
make it quite clear that MGNREGS work
on private land is not completely absent. As
table 3.6 tells us, in the Northeast seven
percent of the works was on the private land
of individuals other than the workers. What
is much more striking is that over a fourth
of the work in the Malnad and Coastal
Districts region was on the workers’ own
land. Taken together with the fact that over
a third of the activities in this region were
concentrated on horticulture, it raises the
question of whether at least a part of the
MGNREGS in this region had become a
labour subsidy for those working on their
own farms.
It is not impossible to make a case for
a labour subsidy in cases of chronic poverty.
A marginal landowner operating at near
subsistence levels may have to choose to
work on other farms rather than cultivating
his land if he needs resources to survive
before the next harvest. In such cases a
labour subsidy would help him cultivate his
own land, thus not only benefiting him
personally but also increasing the land
cultivated and the overall output.
Any assumption that this is indeed
always the case in the Malnad and Coastal
PROVIDING WORK
Table 3.7: Distribution of beneficiaries working
on own land or other private land by land
ownership in Malnad
Land in acres Percentage of
beneficiaries
Landless 7.70
Greater than 0 and
less than or equal to 2 71.2
Greater than 2  and
less than or equal to 5 21.2
Total 100.0
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
Table 3.9: Distribution of beneficiaries working









Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
Table 3.8: Distribution of beneficiaries working
on own land or other private land by
asset class in Malnad
Asset Indicators Percentage of
beneficiaries
0 1.90
Greater than 0 and
less than or equal to 5 61.5
Greater than 5 and
less than or equal to 10 13.5
Greater than 10 and
less than or equal to 20 21.2
Greater than 20 and
less than or equal to 100 0.00
Greater than 100 1.90
Total 100.0
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
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Districts region does however come up
against some facts that suggest otherwise.
As can be seen in Table 3.7 the practice of
working on their own land or other private
land under the MGNREGS was not confined
to the marginal farmers. More than a fifth
of such cases were on the land of those
owning up to five acres. No doubt 71 percent
of such cases were from households owning
less than two acres of land, but in the overall
agrarian context of the Malnad region these
are not likely to be cases of subsistence
agriculture.  This is also borne out by other
indicators of their place in the local economy
and society. Table 3.8 tells us that less than
two percent of those working on their own
land belonged to the zero asset indicator
class, where one would expect subsistence
farmers to be. And Table 3.9 tells us that 92
percent of the beneficiaries belonged to the
forward castes and other backward castes,
far greater than the share of these castes in
the overall population of the region. The
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes each
account for just four percent of these workers.
The picture that emerges of those who
do MGNREGS work on their own land is
thus one of small to middle farmers getting
a labour subsidy. Eighty one percent of these
workers are male. And Table 3.10 tells us
that while a majority of them see themselves
as primarily agricultural labour, as many
as 31 percent see themselves as cultivators.
CONVERGENCE AND SYNERGY
Another interesting, if still quite small
feature, of those who work on private land
is the case of those who work on the land of
other farmers. This category accounted for
seven percent of those who worked under
the MGNREGS in the Northeast. In the
Malnad and Coastal Districts region too, the
eight percent those who worked on private
land and are landless are those who worked
on the land of other farmers. There is thus
evidence of MGNREGS being used as a
labour subsidy not just to help small farmers
on their own farms, but also for other
farmers. These figures are of course still very
small, but they bring up the possibility of
the Scheme being used to create a labour
force that can be given out for other
activities. Indeed, officials in the Malnad and
Coastal Districts region spoke of a need for
a scheme to use this labour to revive paddy
cultivation in the region.
The case for using government
resources to pay for such a labour force in
private farms would need careful
consideration to ensure that it does not
Table 3.10: Occupational profile of
beneficiaries working on own land or







free collection of goods 9.6
Others 5.77
Total 100.00
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
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degenerate into a labour subsidy for
commercially viable crops. But the need to
use the MGNREGS generated labour in
other government schemes has been more
widely discussed and the state government
has emphasised such convergence. On the
ground the results are mixed. In the
Northwest and the Tribal regions, officials
state there is no convergence and there is
little evidence of it found. In the Northeast
officials insist there is no convergence but
there are projects of the Forest Department
that have been carried out with MGNREGS
labour. The composite Picture 3.9 is of a
seedlings project carried out by the Forest
Department. The board states that the project
was carried out with labour from the
MGNREGS.
In both the South region and the
Malnad and Coastal Districts region there
is much more enthusiastic support for
convergence. In the South there are claims
of having worked out a complete
convergence with the sanitation programme
and in the Malnad the claims were of
convergence with the watershed programme.
Such convergence however raises its own
questions relating to the distribution of costs.
In the Malnad and Coastal Districts region
funds from the watershed project were only
tapped when the material required exceeded
what was permissible under the labour
material ratio of the MGNREGS. This also
raises issues of whether the target of the
watershed programme was suitably raised
to account for the resources taken from the
MGNREGS.
The issue of using the MGNREGS as a
labour subsidy for other government
programmes also needs to explicitly discuss
Picture 3.9: Convergence with social forestry work in Bidar district
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the relative importance of different
programmes. The original list of MGNREGS
projects are focused primarily on land
development. As we have said earlier this
emphasis is crucial for resolving the crisis that
threatens Indian agriculture. It is of course
possible to make a case for a labour force
financed through the MGNREGS and used for
all government projects. In addition to being
more efficient it would be easier to find work
for individual workers when they demand it.
But this benefit must be balanced against the
risk of a dilution in the emphasis on the crucial
programmes on land development.
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THE CONSEQUENCES OF WORK
T he consequences of a programmeas wide ranging as the Mahatma
Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme can be felt in a number
of areas. We have already seen how the
Scheme provided much-needed economic
muscle to decentralized institutions; a
process that throws up its own challenges.
The impact on other areas too need not be
one-dimensional. If the scheme provides
agriculture with assets, there is the question
of whether it starves this sector of labour.
While the poor have been benefited, the
poorest have not always been the main
beneficiaries.  Similar complexities can be
found in the realm of migration as well as
the process of generating purchasing power.
And the impact of the Scheme in all these
areas has a gender dimension as well. In
this chapter we take a closer look at the
impact of the MGNREGS on chronic
poverty, agriculture, migration, purchasing
power, and gender.
AGRICULTURE
The popular debate on the impact of
MGNREGS on agriculture has tended to
concentrate on the fact that as an alternative
avenue of employment the Scheme could draw
labour away from farms. Implicit in this
contention is that the assets created under the
MGNREGS are not related to agriculture. This
is quite obviously not the case. The
MGNREGA has been conceived in a way that
the employment it guarantees should be utilised
in a way that addresses some of the primary
concerns of rural India, including agriculture.
There are several long-term investments
required in agriculture that are not viable for
individual farmers. This is particularly true of
dry lands where the required technologies, such
as contour bunds, may involve the land of
more than one farmer. In such cases no
individual farmer will consider it worthwhile
to invest in the asset. It is here that a
programme like the MGNREGS can step in
and create the required assets.
4
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ASSET CREATION
In evaluating whether the MGNREGS
in Karnataka has created assets that
improve the productivity of land, the simple
answer would be positive. The impact of any
land development scheme on the quality of
farm land is very likely to be positive. Check
dams, irrigation canals, wells and other such
assets we referred to in Chapter 3 should all
have had a positive impact. Those benefitting
from these projects too were also enthusiastic
in their assessments of the positive impact
of these assets.
The difficulty arises when we try to
quantify the benefit so as to be able to decide
whether the projects generated the most
productive assets possible. Since the
construction of these assets have many
dimensions, a great deal would depend on
the aspect we focus on. An asset that meets
all the engineering standards may not be as
effective in improving productivity in
agriculture as another asset that could have
been created with the same resources. Again,
while some assets like an irrigation canal
would have an immediate impact others,
Picture 4.1:  An open well in Bidar
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especially some of those related to dry land
agriculture could take longer to take effect.
And since the MGNREGS in most districts
in Karnataka had been in place for less than
three years when this study was conducted,
it may be too soon to look for precise
quantitative assessments.
What must be said, however, is that
there are a number of elements that go into
the creation of assets under the MGNREGS
that may constrain the benefits of the
Scheme. First, in the choice of projects so
far the focus has been on those that relate to
a single gram panchayat. While the formal
processes that have been laid out allow for
projects involving more than one gram
panchayat, in reality such projects are rare.
As a result potentially productive projects
covering the land of more than one gram
panchayat tend to be ignored. This ensures
the MGNREGS projects cannot tap any
economies of scale that may be available.
Second, the choice of projects is
typically first made informally at the gram
panchayat and then checked at the taluk level
to see if fits into the list of permissible
projects. This process does not pay sufficient
attention to the relative productivities of
competing projects. For instance, there could
be two projects that fall under the
permissible list, but which are likely to have
very different effects on the productivity of
land. Since the productivity aspect is not
considered it is quite possible that the less
productive asset will be chosen.
Third, there is a tendency in the most
developed region in the state – the Malnad
and Coastal Districts region – for
MGNREGS labour to be used on own
farms. This approach turns the MGNREGS
into a labour subsidy for the farmer. Such
a subsidy could have a positive impact on
productivity in the case of farmers who are
so poor that they cannot make the basic
investments required on their land. But in
the case of the more prosperous farmers this
only serves to ensure that investment that
would otherwise be provided by the farmer
would now be provided by the state. There
would then be no additional gain in
productivity. If we add the fact that these
resources could have been used in
alternative avenues with greater scope for
increases in productivity, there will be an
overall negative impact. Indeed, when the
phenomenon of work under the Scheme
being carried out on own farms or on other
private land is most prominent in the
richest region of the state, it could be said
that MGNREGS funds are driving out
private investment from agriculture.
And fourth, there are a number of social
and political factors, outlined in Chapter 3,
that could result in less productive projects
gaining preference. Thus while the impact
of MGNREGS on agricultural productivity
is very likely to be significantly positive,
there is reason to believe that it is not always
as beneficial as it could be.
DEMAND FOR LABOUR
An employment guarantee scheme can
affect the availability of labour for
agriculture both directly and indirectly. The
THE CONSEQUENCES OF WORK
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direct effect is when the scheme offers a wage
rate that is higher than that available in
agriculture at the same time. The indirect
effect is that the wage rate offered in the
scheme is available to workers even when
the workers do not actually work in the
MGNREGS. This then becomes the floor
wage rate below which workers will not be
available for work.
Before we go into any detailed analysis
of these effects it is necessary to first
understand whether other work was available
at the time. In all the five regions by far the
most common answer was that no other
work was available, with this being the
response of 99 percent of the beneficiaries
in the South and over 90 percent in the two
northern regions as well. It is only in the
better-off Malnad and Coastal Districts
region that a fourth of the beneficiaries said
they had other options, and even here 16
percent were those who said the other
options were in their own farms or business.
In the South all who said other options were
available, were speaking of work on their
own farms or business. For a vast majority
of the beneficiaries therefore the question of
choosing between mainstream agriculture
and the MGNREGS did not arise.
For those who have the choice, the
wages earned in MGNREGS were generally
well below that available in agriculture or
other wage labour. Table 4.2 tells us that
this was true for male workers in all the
regions with the agricultural wages being
nearly twice the earnings from MGNREGS
in the Northeast. For female workers too
agricultural wages and the earnings of other
daily wage labour were higher than the
earnings from the MGNREGS in three of
the five regions. It is only in the Malnad
and Coastal Districts region and the South
region that this was not the case. The ability
of the MGNREGS to directly draw labour
away from agriculture is therefore quite
limited.
In theory the existence of an
employment guarantee scheme should have
ensured that the guaranteed wage was the
floor below which the market wages cannot
go. And it is true that, with exception of
the women workers in the Malnad and
Coastal Districts region and the South
region, the earnings from agriculture or
other unskilled daily wage work does not
go below the earnings from MGNREGS.
The trouble however is that in the regions
of low awareness about MGNREGS the
Table 4.1: Availability of other work for beneficiaries at the same time as MGNREGS
Northeast Northwest Tribal Malnad South
No other work available 96.51 93.10 84.62 73.12 98.62
In own farm/business 0.00 0.00 5.33 16.13 1.38
In others farms/business 3.49 6.90 10.06 10.75 0.00
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
In percent
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earnings are well below what is stipulated
in the Act. Indeed, the ranking of the regions
in terms of earnings of men under the
MGNREGS is identical to the ranking of
the regions in terms of awareness. The
Malnad and Coastal districts region has the
highest awareness, followed by the South
region, the Tribal region, the Northwest and
the Northeast. As can be seen from Table
4.2 the same ranking holds for earnings
from MGNREGS as well.
On the whole the impact of
MGNREGS on agriculture must be seen to
be positive. The assets created can help
develop the quality of land, especially if
some of the current inadequacies are
addressed. There is little evidence of it
directly drawing labour away from
agriculture on any substantial scale. Its
ability to act as a floor wage too is not
always effective, especially in regions of
low awareness. There could still  be
complaints from those who would not like
to see any government initiative to set a
floor wage. But these complaints must be
weighed against the fact that wages that
actually exist on the ground in some parts
of rural Karnataka are well below the
officially specified minimum wage.
CHRONIC POVERTY
The differences in earnings from
MGNREGS that are evident between the
different regions of Karnataka are mirrored
within each region as well. Even within
agriculture the cultivators consistently
reported higher earnings from MGNREGS
than the landless agricultural labour. This
THE CONSEQUENCES OF WORK
Table 4.2: Daily wages in Agriculture, MGNREGS and other daily wage unskilled work
Region Agricultural daily wage Other daily wage MGNREGS earnings
Male Female Overall Male Female Overall Male Female Overall
Northeast 116.67 64.00 83.75 118.50 70.56 95.42 61.70 59.10 60.18
Northwest 97.61 68.85 87.22 133.32 70.92 100.34 62.20 52.20 58.27
Tribal 120.66 76.00 98.33 115.99 77.26 98.65 74.50 56.10 65.28
Malnad 127.08 80.00 113.24 125.35 80.30 112.53 112.00 92.70 103.75
South 116.67 62.5 85.72 111.71 52.65 92.31 86.70 80.90 84.56
Karnataka 114.59 68.42 91.61 120.20 66.50 98.55 80.40 70.70 76.26
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
In rupees
Table 4.3: Region-wise MGNREGS wage rate
comparison between beneficiaries who
are cultivators and landless agricultural
and wage labour









Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
In rupees
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was true for all five regions. As can be seen
in Table 4.3, the only variation in this
pattern was the extent of this difference. This
variation in the earnings from the
MGNREGS makes it clear that the mere
existence of beneficiaries of the Scheme does
not mean it is as good a safety net as it can
be. And the main effect of such a deficiency
will be on the goal of the scheme to make a
significant difference to chronic poverty.
Identifying the chronic poor would
normally take us into the contentious issue
of defining the poverty line. Since better
minds than us have been unable to reach
an agreement on this issue we would be
better served by not attempting an answer
to this question. What we do instead is to
focus entirely on those who have none of
the assets we had listed when defining our
asset indicator; that is those among the
landless who do not have even a cycle in
their household. While this rather extreme
condition could leave out others who are
in fact chronically poor, it is very unlikely
that a household that cannot afford even
basic assets would not be among the
poorest. For the purpose of this study the
chronic poor are those households that do
not have any of the assets used to make
our asset indicator.
Given the fact that addressing chronic
poverty is one of the stated goals of the
Scheme, it would be reasonable to expect
that a greater proportion of the chronic
poor are beneficiaries of the scheme when
compared to other sections of society. The
picture from the ground does not however
suggest that this is the case in Karnataka.
Table 4.4 tells us that other than in
Northeast the proportion of beneficiaries
among the chronically poor is less than the
proportion of beneficiaries among the
others in the rural community. While the
share of beneficiaries among the sections
of the rural community who are not chronic
poor is only marginally higher in the
Northwest, the differences in the other
regions are quite significant. Indeed, in the
Tribal region the proportion of labour
beneficiaries among those who are not
amongst the chronic poor is more than
twice the proportion among the chronic
poor. This pattern suggests that the chronic
poor may have higher transaction costs that
prevent them from being among the
beneficiaries of MGNREGS.
The impression of the chronic poor
having to meet higher transaction costs than
others is strengthened by the earnings from
MGNREGS reported by the beneficiaries. As
can be seen from Table 4.5, in three of the
Table 4.4: Region-wise distribution of










Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
In percent
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five regions of the state the earnings of the
chronic poor from MGNREGS is
significantly lower than that of those who
are not among the chronic poor. Even in
the more developed areas, such as the
Malnad and Coastal Districts region, where
the earnings of the chronic poor are the
highest when compared to other regions, the
earning of others from the MGNREGS is
greater. And in the two regions where there
is no significant difference between the
earnings of the chronic poor and the others
– the Northeast and the Tribal regions – the
actual earnings are much lower than that
specified under the MGNREGS.
The case for better targeting of the
chronic poor is reinforced by the fact that
the current measures may not be entirely
adequate. The provision that Below Poverty
Line (BPL) card holders can work on their
own land, for instance, can be an important
benefit to marginal farmers, but it does not
help the landless. And interventions through
the BPL card must also deal with the fact
that it does not cover all the chronically
poor. While there has been much criticism
of this card also being issued to some of
those who are not poor, our data suggests
we cannot be certain that all the poor are
themselves covered. Table 4.6 tells us that
even if we take the BPL cards and the
Antyodaya cards together it does not cover
all the chronic poor. In the Northeast,
Northwest and the Tribal regions around a
fifth of the chronic poor are left out. Indeed,
in some regions, particularly the Northwest
and the Tribal regions, there is no great
difference between the proportion of chronic
THE CONSEQUENCES OF WORK
Table 4.5: Region-wise MGNREGS
wages amongst chronic poor and other
beneficiaries









Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
In rupees
Table 4.6: Access of poor households to ration cards
Region Households with BPL cards Households with Antyodaya cards
Chronic poor Others Chronic poor Others
Northeast 62.69 55.63 19.40 6.62
Northwest 60.00 58.79 18.57 7.27
Tribal 57.89 55.11 21.05 8.67
Malnad 67.74 48.84 22.58 5.78
South 76.71 71.70 17.81 8.52
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
In percent
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poor who have BPL cards and the
proportion of BPL cardholders among those
who are not chronic poor. It must be
mentioned that the Antyodaya scheme
appears better targeted at the chronic poor.
MIGRATION
It is sometimes suggested that the
MGNREGS will have an impact on
migration from the villages to the cities. By
offering rural workers work in the village it
will reduce the need for workers to go to the
city to seek employment. Keeping in mind
the fact that the MGNREGS had been
implemented in all the districts of Karnataka
for just two years at the time of the survey,
we focused on the migration that had taken
place in the preceding year. The results failed
to confirm the expectation that MGNREGS
reduces migration. On the contrary there may
even be case to argue that the beneficiaries
of the MGNREGS were more inclined to
migrate. Table 4.7 tells us that in every region
other than the Northeast the migration among
beneficiaries was higher than among the non-
beneficiaries of the Scheme.
The possible tendency for MGNREGS
to encourage migration is not entirely
surprising. Migration by the poor can be both
a means of getting out of distress, and a
means of seeking out better opportunities.
In cases where the urge to migrate is the
result of distress, the MGNREGS would act
as an incentive not to migrate. In cases where
the urge to migrate is in search of better
opportunities the MGNREGS could well
provided the limited resources need to seek
better opportunities elsewhere. When we look
at the purpose of migration, in Table 4.8
both these patterns are evident. In the
northeast the main purpose is agriculture
or other wage labour. It is quite likely that
those who migrate in search of wage labour
are doing so out of distress. It is thus no









Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
In percent
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
Table 4.8: Region-wise, gender-wise purpose of migration
Northeast Northwest Tribal Malnad South
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
Agriculture and 80.00 76.92 0.00 9.52 80.00 69.57 0.00 10.34 0.00 7.14
other wage labour
Salaried employed 0.00 15.38 0.00 14.29 0.00 21.74 45.45 75.86 100.00 71.43
and other business
Others 20.00 7.69 100.00 76.19 20.00 8.7 54.55 13.79 0.00 21.43
In percent
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surprise that in the Northeast the MGNREGS
acts as a disincentive to migration. In
contrast, in the Malnad and Coastal Districts
region the migration in search agricultural
or other wage labour is limited. The search
for more permanent employment or other
opportunities that dominates migration in
this region is aided by the resources provided
by the MGNREGS. This would contribute
to the fact that the beneficiaries of
MGNREGS in this region show a greater
tendency to migrate than the non-
beneficiaries.
PURCHASING POWER
One of the major macroeconomic
effects of the schemes under the MGNREGA
is believed to be the purchasing power it
generates. The massive allocations for the
Schemes are likely to have played their part
in ensuring that India could generate an
internal demand to offset the global
economic crisis of 2008. This impact is not
only in terms of the amounts directly spent
but also due to, what economists call, the
multiplier.1 The higher the multiplier the
greater is the number of times the original
expenditure must be multiplied to get the
overall purchasing power. In order to
calculate the multiplier we  needed the
propensity to consume from the earnings
from MGNREGS as well as the overall
propensity in the economy as a whole. To
calculate the propensity to consume from
MGNREGS earnings we asked beneficiaries
how they spent their last MGNREGS
payment, including how much was saved.
In order to minimise the recall bias we only
asked this information of beneficiaries of
MGNREGS who had worked during the
preceding year.
The picture that emerges from the
patterns of expenditure from MGNREGS
payments is one of the multiplier effects
being quite significant, ranging from 3.14
in the Northwest region to 3.62 in the
Malnad and Coastal Districts region. The
limited variation across regions is not in
line with the expectation that the richer
regions would save more and spend less.
The richest region, the Malnad and Coastal
Districts region, has the highest multiplier.
There are, however, no discernible patterns
either across regions or across gender.
There is also no suggestion that gender has
a clear impact on expenditure patterns.
While in some regions women do tend to
save more and hence have a lower
multiplier effect, this pattern is reversed
in other regions.
1 The multiplier is based on the fact that money spent is income in the hands of the receiver of the money. The
recipient will save some of this income and spend the rest. What she spends is once again income for the new
recipient, who will save some of it and spend the rest. And so on. It is obvious that the additional purchasing
power generated depends on how much is saved and how much is spent.  The more that is spent at each stage
the greater will be the purchasing power that is generated from the original expenditure. This overall
purchasing power is a multiple of the original expenditure. The multiplier is this multiple. The method we
have  used to calculate the multiplier is given in Appendix 2
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The effect of the multiplier on the rural
economy would of course be influenced by
how much of the additional purchasing power
generated from a rural employment scheme
is spent on items produced in the rural
economy. Tracking the rural and non-rural
component of each round of expenditure is
of course an impossibility. In order to get a
rough estimate we have assumed that food,
rent, entertainment and tuition would be
largely produced in the rural economy, while
other products would not. Table 4.10 tells us
that a greater proportion of the income
generated from MGNREGS tends to be spent
on the rural economy, at least in the first
round of the multiplier.
The focus on the purchasing power that
is generated is not just for its own sake but
to find out the direction of expenditure. The
generation of purchasing power would be
particularly useful if it was used towards
easing some of the shortfalls in rural society,
particularly in food, education and health.
Quite predictably, Table 4.11 tells us that
the poorest region in Karnataka – the
Northeast – spends the highest proportion
of income from MGNREGS on food. The
expenditure from MGNREGS income in
other regions sometimes reflects the
characteristics the region is commonly
identified with. The fact that the only region
spending a significant amount of
MGNREGS income on education is the
Malnad and Coastal Districts region is quite
consistent with the strides that region has
made in the field of education. What is more
disconcerting is the relatively high levels of
expenditure on health in the Tribal region.
Table 4.9: The Multiplier from MGNREGS
payments by region and gender
Region Gender and Multiplier
Female Male Total
Northeast 3.32 3.39 3.35
Northwest 3.23 3.10 3.14
Tribal 3.67 3.17 3.31
Malnad 3.63 3.60 3.62
South 3.01 3.54 3.35
Karnataka 3.28 3.40 3.34
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
Table 4.10: Gender and rural expenditure
Region Proportion of MGNREGS income spent on Proportion of MGNREGS income
  items primarily produced in rural areas  spent on other items
Female Male Female Male
Northeast 46.00 69.00 5.00 15.00
Northwest 44.00 30.00 31.00 16.00
Tribal 27.00 32.00 37.00 38.00
Malnad 29.00 42.00 31.00 38.00
South 37.00 46.00 30.00 37.00
Karnataka 38.00 44.00 27.00 29.00
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
In percent
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GENDER
Countering gender discrimination is a
theme that is central to the MGNREGA. Men
and women are expected to be paid the same
wages. But there are a number of
mechanisms including the measurement of
work that can be used to differentiate between
the wages finally earned by men and that
earned by women. In our quantitative survey
men and women workers reported significant
differences in the wages earned for
MGNREGS work. Table 4.2 earlier in this
chapter indicated that women reported
lower wages than men for MGNREGS work
in all five regions of Karnataka. These
differences went up to nearly Rs 20 in the
Malnad and Coastal Districts region and Rs
18 in the Tribal region. Where the
MGNREGS does appear to have been
successful is in reducing the gender difference
in wages when compared to both agriculture
and other unskilled daily wage work. As
Table 4.2 told us the gender difference in
both agriculture and other unskilled daily
wage work was substantially greater than
that prevailing in the MGNREGS. Even in
the areas reporting substantial gender
differences in MGNREGS earning, the
differences in agriculture and other unskilled
daily wage work was far greater. The highest
difference of Rs 20 between the MGNREGS
earnings was in a region where the difference
between male and female wages in both
agriculture and other unskilled daily wage
work was over Rs 45.
The gender dimension of the
MGNREGA is also reflected in the
requirement that women should account for
at least a third of the person days worked.
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Table 4.11: Expenditure on health, nutrition and education
Region Proportion of income from Proportion of income from Proportion of income from
MGNREGS spent on food MGNREGS spent on health MGNREGS spent on tuition
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Northeast 45.83 69.25 1.16 2.63 0.00 0.00
Northwest 43.75 29.65 11.25 4.17 0.00 0.00
Tribal 25.25 29.74 17.02 13.37 0.00 0.25
Malnad 25.60 36.83 6.63 8.95 2.62 3.67
South 36.33 46.33 9.57 11.44 0.07 0.06
Karnataka 36.47 42.78 8.97 8.30 0.46 0.65
Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
In percent
Table 4.12: Gender difference in person-days








Source: NIAS MGNREGS Survey, 2010-11
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This norm is met in all the five regions. In
three of the regions – the Malnad and
Coastal Districts, the South, and the
Northwest – the employment of women is
just around the one-third mark. But in the
Tribal region and in the Northeast, women
account for far greater numbers than the
minimum that is specified. As can be seen
in Table 4.12 the share of women in the total
person-days worked in the Northeast is as
high as 58 percent.
The overall impact of the MGNREGS
on gender issues must then be seen as
positive, though far from being
revolutionary. The Scheme has reduced the
gender differences in wages that are
dominant in the agrarian society, but it has
not been able to remove them altogether.
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THE PROCESSES
T he processes to be used in theimplementation of the
MGNREGS in Karnataka have been laid
out by the Department of Rural
Development and Panchayat Raj in a set
of 80 specific steps. An evaluation of the
processes thus has two dimensions. It must
assess whether each of these specific steps
has been followed; and it must consider
whether these steps are the best suited to
implement the Scheme in the context of the
specific conditions prevailing in different
parts of Karnataka. The first dimension is
addressed here through assessments based
on discussions with officials at the zilla
panchayats, taluk panchayats and gram
panchayats in all the five regions we have
identified in Karnataka. This is essentially
an outsider’s assessment and would need
to be evaluated in the context of the
information available within the
government. A brief summary of our
assessment of the functioning of each of the
80 steps is given in the extended Table 5.1.
These processes are however not carried out
in a vacuum. They interact with the specific
conditions in each gram panchayat. And
we have seen in the earlier chapters that
these conditions do tend to vary quite
substantially between regions. In what
follows in this chapter therefore we will be
looking at the operation of each of these
steps in the context of the varying
conditions across Karnataka. For
convenience, the processes involved in the
implementation and monitoring of the
scheme are grouped into five sets: those
relating to awareness, those relating to job
cards, those relating to getting work, those
relating to the choice of projects, those
relating to the implementation of the
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Table 5.1: MGNREGS Process Chart


















Placing the application for
approval before GP (5.3.1)
Issue JC or reject after the
approval of GP
Enter the complete data in MIS
Inform the line departments to
submit the list of permissible
works to be taken up
Submission of work list by the
line departments to the
respective IAs














Limited efforts in all five regions
Both verbal and written applications
accepted. In some GPs two photos are
to be brought by the applicant.
Acknowledgement slip generally not
given.
Enquiry about the genuineness of the
applicant is done by GP officials, but
quality of enquiry varies from GP to GP
The GP secretary decides on the
application based on the enquiry.
Depending on his enquiry the GP
Secretary issues the card
For GPs where computers/ computer
operators are not available MIS is filled
at the Taluk Panchayat. In GP's having
computers and net connection,
computer operators fill the MIS.
Line departments are often not asked
to provide lists
Line departments do not submit lists of
permissible works
This is done
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Draw calendar to organize GS in
the taluk on 2nd Oct every year
Notifying the date for GS and
give publicity
Inform the GS about the duties
and responsibilities
Assessment of labour demand
for the next year
Recommendations and
prioritization of works as per








The EO sends out the notices but
meeting not usually held on that date
GPs arrange for announcements by
mike, accompanied by the beating of
drums, and for pamphlets about Gram
Sabha /Ward Sabha meetings. In some
GPs in the Northwest region no
announcements are made.
The Gram Sabhas are informed about
their duties and responsibilities by the
concerned staff member, generally the
Panchayat Development Officer.
In some cases it is decided by the ZP
and in other cases by the Taluk
Panchayat. The formal budget is then
worked out at the GP. The norms for
deciding the budget also tends to vary.
In the Northeast the norm appears to
be the number of job cards times 100
days times the wage. In other regions it
is taken as a percentage of this figure.
In yet other areas it is decided by first
estimating the overall budget based on
the current year's progress and then
taking 60 percent of this figure.
Prioritization typically done by the
GP. The line departments also
participate in these meetings.
The Gram Sabha proceedings are
drawn in all the GPs
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Arrange for GP meeting
Place the recommended work list
in GP and get the approval
EO should get the work list to be
executed from the line
departments at taluk level that
involve more than one GP
GP should send the approved
list to TP within 15 days from
the date of GS along with GS
resolution
Check the list as per guidelines; if
any discrepancies send it back
for rectification by GP
GP should rectify it and
resubmit
Consolidate the list and place
before TP for approval within 15
days
TP shall approve within 15 days
from the date of submission by
EO. If not EO shall approve it
and submit to ZP (4.4.11)
CEO shall get the work list to be
executed from the line
departments at district level that










The GP staff arrange for the GP meeting.
The recommended work list is placed
before the GP for approval.
Generally there are very few works that
involve more than one GP.
Due to multiple responsibilities of the
GP staff and the availability of all GP
members, this does not seem to be
followed.
The TP does not accept an action plan
until it follows the guidelines.
The list is sent back to the GP for
rectification. In some cases the
rectification is done by the GP
secretary in the Taluk Panchayat office.
No account is generally kept of the time
taken, though officials insist it is done
as soon as possible.
No account is generally kept of the time
taken, though officials insist it is done
as soon as possible.
Typically very few works involve more
than one taluk
No. Process details Responsibil ity Assessment based on NIAS
qualitative survey









Consolidate the list and place
before ZP for approval
ZP shall approve within 15 days
from the date of submission by
CEO. If not CEO shall approve it
and send to TP/GP.(This should
be completed by 31st
Dec)(4.4.11)
EO shall communicate the
approved plan to the respective
line departmental EAs and GPs
EAs shall visit sites and prepare
the estimates clearly showing
wage and material components
and material procurement plan
separately
Along with technical sanction
estimates to be submitted to the
respective IAs (ZP/TP/GP)
IAs shall keep them in the shelf
after due administrative sanction
(Shelf of projects)
Details of shelf of projects to be
entered in MIS
No additional works would be










Typically no changes are made at the
ZP level
Generally approved and sent back by
CEO
Generally done
The estimates showing wage & material
components for the site, are prepared
by the line department officers.
The work list having the technical
sanction by the line departments and
the administrative approval by the TP/
ZP are handed over to the GP.
Copies of the list of approved works is
available at the GPs.
Entered either at GP or at TP
depending on the availability of
computer operators, generally at the TP.
This is followed.
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Application for the demand
for employment
Entry of demand in MIS
Generate the acknowledgement
and give to the JC holders
Verify the status of fund and
make necessary arrangements to
have the required funds
Allocate the work within 15
days as per the Act (6.4.4)
Issue notice to the applicants to
attend the work and put it on the
notice board
Issue work order to the
respective EAs to start the work










applications and wait for a group of
people to apply.
Since the GP's discourage individual
applications and wait for a group of
people to apply, there is rarely an
immediate entry of demand in the MIS.
This is not always given.
The GP staff is regularly in touch with
TP authorities on this issue.
After a group of workers have
applied for work there seems to
be some action in allocating
work. But the delay is in
accepting the applications.
The workers themselves come and ask
about status.
The EO of the TP issues the work
order. In some GP's, this is not always
followed; sometimes work starts before
a work order is issued.
Manual NMR is maintained at the GP
which is then later used to generate the
NMR for website. Due to the tight
timelines associated, manual NMRs are
preferred.
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Issue NMR and MB to the EAs
or Mates (6.5.4)
Get the acknowledgement for the
issue of NMR
Usage of NMR at the work site
Brief the laborers about the
work and give mark out at work
site
Photo of the work site before
execution
Management of work site
facilities
Day to day recording of
measurements in MB at the
work site and inspection by
VMCs










Not applicable  in view of above
Not done. Work records are usually
maintained in informal notebook.
Work is assigned to a group of workers
and not individual workers. Mark out
for a fixed number of days is given.
Photo of the worksite before execution
is not generally taken.
While there are claims of
facilities being available, these
were not seen the work sites the
team visited.
Daily measurements are not
taken at all the GP's. There are
GP's where measurement of work
for a fixed number of days is
given to the group of workers,
measurement in such cases are
taken only after the completion
of the fixed number of days. The
GP staff prefers to take rough
measurements before finalizing
them.
Once the work begins, the GP normally
employs the services of a photographer
to take some photos.
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Weekly verification of recorded
measurements in MB and
certification
Closure of NMR at the end of the
week
Submission of certified NMR
and MB to GP along with photo
Verification of certificate and the
correctness of data in NMR and
MB
Entry of certified filled NMR /MB
in the MIS within 15 days from
the date of generation of NMR
If sufficient fund is available
make the payment or otherwise
get the funds and make the
payment
Release the funds to the
respective level as per the
procedure and enter in MIS
Receive the funds in MIS and
keep update the cash book
Enter the filled NMR in the MIS












Measurements are done only after some
specified number of days of work and
not necessarily verified weekly.
Since manual NMR's are used, the
closure of NMR is not necessarily at the
end of the week.
The GP is the executing agency. Hence,
this is generally done only after a work
gets completed.
Verification is not always stringent.
This is done, but there is often some
delay.
Immediate payment is rarely made. It
takes a minimum of 15 days after the
work gets completed, for payment. The
workers say the payments take much
longer, going up to several months.
Done with delays.
The GP receives the funds and updates
the cash book. The MIS is not always
immediately updated.
The NMR is filled in the MIS and the
wage list is generated.
No. Process details Responsibil ity Assessment based on NIAS
qualitative survey
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No. Process details Responsibil ity Assessment based on NIAS
qualitative survey
Payment is made as per Schedule
of Rates and the measurements
recorded by the line departments.
This is done.
All GP's issue cheques to the
bank/post office with the
certified wage list. It was
however noticed that in some
cases the cheques for different
job cards were made out to the
same bank account.
This is done by the JE for the GP and
the concerned line department
personnel.
The GP arranges for a photographer
who captures a photo of the completed
work.
The work completion certificate along
with certified MB and completion
photos are available at the GP.
Some GP's do not complete these
procedures immediately.
All documents required for the audit











Make payment to the
labourers as per the wage
list
If any expenditure on
administration enter the same in
MIS
Issue of cheque to the
concerned Bank/PO for




Photo of the completed work
Submission of the work
completion certificate along with
certified MB and completion
photos (6.9)
Enter the completion details in
MIS and file the completion
certificate
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No. Process details Responsibil ity Assessment based on NIAS
qualitative survey
Submit the audited report to the
respective level and compliance
there of.
EAs shall submit the request for
funds to procure the materials as
per the plan
Materials shall be procured by
GP following the procedure or
required funds may be given to
EA
If procured by GP take them
into stock and issue to EA
Record the material in MB take
photo and certify the same
Make payment to the supplier by
A/C pay cheque only
Enter the details of material and
payment in MIS or the fund
transfer to EA
Acknowledge the receipt of
funds
EAs shall procure the material
following the procedure
Take them in stock and record it
in MB, take photo and certify the
same
Make payment to the supplier by













These procedures are followed by the
GP.
Generally, the GP is involved in the
procurement of material for the works.
Though, the GP is involved in the
procurement of material for the works,
they are directly made available at the
work site.
Typically the material is directly made
available at the work site.
Material is recorded in MB but photos
are not generally taken.
This is done.
The details of material and payment
given are recorded in the MIS.
The GP acknowledges the receipt of
funds.
Generally, the GP is involved in the
procurement of material for the works.
The material is usually directly made
available at the work site. Photos are
not taken of the material.
Payment to the supplier is done by the
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No. Process details Responsibil ity Assessment based on NIAS
qualitative survey
Enter the details of material and
payment in MIS
Submit the certified copies to IAs
for filing





The details of material and payment
given are recorded in the MIS.
The certified copies are available at the
GP.
The certified copies are available at the




IA - Implementing Agency (ZP/TP/GP)
EA - Executing Agency (Line
Departments)
TA - Technical Assistant taken on
outsource basis
LD - Line Department
GP - GP
EO - Executive Officer
NMR - Nominal Muster roll
MIS - Management Information System
PO - Post Office
PDO - Panchayat Development Officer
GPS - GP Secretray
ZP - ZP
TP - Taluk Panchayat
CEO - Chief Executive Officer
LB - Labour Budget
JC - Job card
MB - Measurement Book
GS - Gram Sabha
Abbreviations:
PROCESSES FOR AWARENESS
Discussions at the zilla panchayats,
taluk panchayats and gram panchayats give
a distinct impression that the creation of
awareness about the MGNREGS is
generally not very high on the list of
priorities of the officials. A common
complaint was that given their overall
workload this was an additional burden.
While the basic steps, such as making the
announcements accompanied by the beating
of drums or printing pamphlets, were carried
out, there was not too much attention paid
to just how effective these steps were in the
creation of awareness.
As a result the levels of awareness were
typically determined outside the government
machinery. Regions with long traditions of
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political awareness, particularly the Malnad
and Coastal Districts region, also had very
high levels of awareness of the MGNREGS.
Conversely, regions with relatively limited
successes in the past in the mobilization of
rural workers, particularly the Northeast and
the Northwest regions, had very little
awareness of the Scheme. Interestingly, even
in these low awareness regions the districts
with the active involvement of Non
Government Organizations had a noticeably
higher level of awareness. The difference
between the areas with NGO work and those
without such work in the two Northern
regions, the regions with the least awareness,
is evident in Table 5.2.
PROCESSES RELATING TO JOB
CARDS
The processes relating to the issue of
job cards gave us our first exposure to a
recurring theme in the implementation of the
Scheme: informal processes on the ground
that are later formalized in the MIS. The
prescribed procedure for the issue of job cards
is that the worker must apply either in writing
or verbally to the gram panchayat. The
application must be acknowledged. It must
then be processed and placed for approval
before the gram panchayat. The job card
should then be issued based on the approval
of the gram panchayat and the data entered
into the MIS.
We could not however come up against
any evidence that the acknowledgements
were issued. There was also an apparent
tendency for the gram panchayat secretary
to take over the entire process of issuing job
cards. This informal process seemed to be
accepted at the local level because those who
were aware of the MGNREGS typically did
not face too much difficulty in getting a job
card. But since the acknowledgement slips
were not issued, there was no independent
record of how many workers actually applied
for a job card. This left open the possibility
of job cards being issued in the names of
those who did not apply. Indeed, we cannot
completely rule out the possibility of job
cards being issued to non-existent
individuals.
PROCESSES RELATING TO GETTING
WORK
The prescribed procedure for getting
work is that once a worker applies for work
his/her demand should be entered in the
MIS. An acknowledgement should be
generated and given to the job card holders.
The status of funds should then be verified
and arrangements made to have the required
funds. Work must then allocated within 15
days. Notice should then be given to
applicants to attend work. Once the work is
Table 5.2: Awareness in the Northeast and
Northwest regions by NGO presence
Awareness of Awareness of
scheme 100 days
entitlement
Districts with 37.0 18.9
NGO presence
Districts without 17.1 6.7
NGO presence
Source: NIAS MGNREGS survey, 2010-11
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done the payment is to be made by cheque
to the account of the worker.
On the ground the demand for work is
not taken into account immediately. The
worker is typically asked to come only after
putting together a group of at least ten workers.
Once such a group is formed and the funds
are available, the jobs are given. Sometimes
even at this stage there is no formal record
and the records are maintained in a notebook.
The formal procedure is launched later. Once
the formal procedure is launched every effort
is made to meet the deadlines that have been
set. There is a possibility of there being
differences between the records maintained in
the notebook and the official Nominal Muster
Rolls (NMRs). The check against such
differences is that the payments can only be
made by cheque. While this norm of only
making payments by cheque is strictly
maintained, it still does not rule out two
possibilities of misuse. First, since
acknowledgement slips are not usually issued
to those applying for job cards, there is the
possibility of job cards for fictitious individuals.
These job cards can then be used to generate
payments. Second, in several regions it was
noticed that several job cards were identified
with the same bank account number. This was
attributed to the fact that the workers did not
have bank accounts. But the fact that the
payments were transferred to an account other
than that of the worker, it raised the possibility
of workers not getting their full wages. These
practices would only be possible with the
support of the gram panchayat, and it would
be difficult for the gram panchayat to do so
when there is wide awareness on the ground.
It is worth noting that the difference in the
proportion of houses with job cards calculated
from the data on the official website and the
figures thrown up in our household survey is
least in regions known for popular political
mobilization, especially the Malnad and
Coastal Districts region.
PROCESSES RELATED TO THE
CHOICE OF PROJECTS
The choice of projects also provides a
picture of informal processes that are later
brought in line with the formal
requirements. The formal procedure is
based on the line departments providing a
list of permissible projects. This list is then
consolidated by officials at the zilla, taluk
and gram panchayats. The gram sabha is to
be then called to evaluate the labour
demand for the next year. Based on this
labour demand the gram panchayat is then
expected to prioritize the works.
Typically the list of projects is worked
out informally without too much
involvement of the Line Departments. The
labour demand is then made through
varying rule-of-thumb calculations. In some
cases these calculations are based on the job
cards issued. In other cases, it is simply a
projection based on the current year’s
progress, with the overall MGNREGS budget
of the current year being taken as given,
and 60 percent of that figure taken as the
labour expenditure. Both these processes
have their limitations as there are reasons
to doubt the genuineness of the number of
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job cards, and the labour material ratio is
also not always maintained.
PROCESSES RELATING TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF PROJECTS
The processes of implementation have
a number of dimensions of which two appear
to be in need of early attention: the
procurement of materials, and the facilities
provided to workers. The formal procedure
for the procurement of materials requires
that the materials either be provided by the
gram panchayat or the funds be given to
the executing agency, that is, the line
departments. If the material is procured by
the gram panchayat, they have to be taken
into stock and then issued to the executing
agency. In either case, the material has to
be recorded and a photograph taken. The
payment has to be made to the suppliers
through account payee cheques only.
Typically the gram panchayats
preferred to procure the material
themselves. The only exception we found
was in the case of social forestry projects,
where the saplings were provided by the
forest department. There were however
several indications of the specific steps
Picture 5.1: Women workers with their own water at a work site in the South region
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required by the formal process not being
followed. No photograph was usually taken
of the material and it was brought directly
to the work site. Once the project was
completed the required photographs were
taken and the accounts updated on the MIS.
The workers are also required to be provided
with a number of facilities. In the work sites
that this team visited, there were few
indications of these facilities. The general
pattern appeared to be for the workers to
take care of themselves, bringing even their
own water. Picture 5.1 of workers at a work
site in the South region captures this reality.
THE MONITORING PROCESSES
A striking feature of the
conceptualization of the MGNREGS is that
it requires monitoring not only from within
the government machinery but also through
a Social Audit. Within the government
machinery, official functionaries at the
taluk level need to verify 100 percent of
the works; official functionaries at the
district level need to verify 10 percent of
the works, while official functionaries at the
state level need to verify 2 percent of the
works. However, the qualitative survey
found very few cases of 100 percent of the
Picture 5.2: Social audit in progress in Davangere
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works being verified by taluk level
functionaries. Similarly, there were very few
cases where district level officials and state
level officials completed the mandated
verification of 10 percent of works and 2
percent of works, respectively.
The emphasis on Social Audits in the
MGNREGS is reflected in the number of
audits being carried out. These audits are
typically carried out as per the requirements.
But there are reasons to doubt their
effectiveness. The most significant of these
reasons, as can be seen from Picture 5.2 is
that there is little public involvement in these
audits. As a result, the requirement of Social
Audits is met more in letter than in spirit.
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CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
O n the basis of our analysis of thefunctioning of the Mahatma Gandhi
National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme in Karnataka in the preceding
chapters we are now in a position to first
summarise our findings and then suggest
changes in processes, and fresh initiatives,
that will bring the Scheme more in line with
its objectives. In this summary we will
confine ourselves to the specific provisions
of the Act and the processes used to
implement them. This is not to suggest that
the impact of the MGNREGS on the rural
economy and society is not significant.
Indeed, many of the conclusions reached in
earlier chapters make it clear that this wider
influence is indeed quite substantial. But
since the focus of this study is the specific
processes required to implement the Act in
Karnataka, we confine our summary to the
working of the existing processes.  In order
to provide this picture in as concise a form
as possible we have summarised it into a
6
single table, Table 6.1. This table looks at
specific elements required by the Mahatma
Gandhi Natiional Rural Employment
Guarantee Act, and lists our findings
regarding their operation in Karnataka.
These findings call for specific
recommendations to address some of the
areas of concern. Before going on to the
specific recommendations it would be useful
to first outline the broad principles that form
the basis of what we believe should be done.
The first principle is that the regional
variations within Karnataka are too wide
to be ignored. The MGNREGS may be built
on a common set of norms for the country
as a whole and certainly for the state, but
the interaction of these norms with the local
rural economy is such that the Scheme
generates very different consequences in
different parts of the state. In the Northwest
the low levels of awareness contribute not
just to low levels of implementation, but also
have transaction costs that ensure the wages
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Guarantee of right to work to each
household
Disbursement of wages not later than
14 days after work was done
Daily unemployment allowance
Reporting matter of non-payment of
unemployment allowance
Monitoring of projects by
Programme Officer
The Gram Panchayat shall identify
projects based on recommendations
of gram sabhas and ward sabhas
At least 50 percent of the works must
be implemented by Gram Panchayat
Muster rolls
Availability of technical staff
Creation of durable assets
The cost of the material components
of projects, including cost of skilled
and semi-skilled workers, shall not
exceed 40 percent
Gram panchayats discourage individual
applications and wait for a group of people
to apply.
Payment only made after measurement,
which is often after completion of project.
This can take up to several months.
Unemployment allowance is typically not
paid.
As unemployment allowance is typically not
paid, this procedure is not followed.
While Programme Officers do visit project
sites, they typically do not visit all the
projects sites in their Taluk.
Though gram sabhas and ward sabhas  are
held, the identification of projects is
primarily done by members of the gram
panchayat.
Almost all the works are implemented by
the gram panchayat.
Attendance is noted in a notebook at the
worksite, which is later transferred to the
nominal muster roll.
Lack of adequate number of staff and
technical support was noted at the gram
panchayats.
Uneven quality of assets. Variable number of
beneficiaries for the same amount spent.
Some households benefit from more than
one asset created.
The 60:40 ratio is sought to be maintained
only for the gram panchayat as a whole and
not for individual projects. And even this
target is not always met.

















must accept valid applications and
issue a dated receipt. Group
applications can also be submitted
Intimation of work
Unemployment allowance
Display of list of workers
Facilities of safe drinking water,
shade for children and periods of
rest, first-aid box shall be provided at
the worksite
Compensation in case of delayed
payment
Officially no contractor is used. But
informal information points to some gram
panchayat members doubling as
contractors.
Frequency of inspection and supervision by
taluk, district, and state level officials below
prescribed norms.
Individual applications not usually
accepted. Asked to apply only in a group.
Receipts are not usually given.
Letters are not sent to applicants. Very few
gram panchayats display public notices.
Information usually given informally.
Found no evidence of unemployment
allowance being paid.
No display of list of workers on the notice
board of the gram panchayat or at the office
of the Programme Officer.
Few signs of such facilities at the worksites.
Though delay in payments can go up to
several months, we did not come across any
evidence of compensation being paid.
the workers in the Scheme report are far
below the stipulated amount. At the other
extreme in the Malnad and the Coastal
Districts region there are very high levels
of implementation and workers report high
wages under the Scheme. But in this region
a significant proportion of the work is on
own land or other private land, so that
the MGNREGS turns out to be not very
different from a labour subsidy. Our
recommendations must then take into
account the fact that the same set of norms
can mean different things in different places.
A second concern underlying our
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recommendations is that the goals listed in
the MGNREGS that go beyond the
employment guarantee – removing chronic
poverty, development of agriculture, and
decentralization – are as important as the
100 days of employment. The need to address
the issue of chronic poverty is an essential
part of the justification for using state funds
to provide employment guarantee. The crisis
in agriculture that is reflected in high food
prices is at least partly the result of the land
quality in the less developed regions being
allowed to deteriorate and cultivators in the
more developed regions moving out of food
crops. And decentralization is an essential
part of the democratic process. Any
shortfalls in this system have to be rectified
rather than moving back to systems of
centralized control.
Based on these two broad
considerations we can go on to identify
specific recommendations in the processes
of getting jobs, providing jobs, managing
the consequences of the Scheme, and




The levels of awareness are uneven
across different regions. While the Malnad
and Coastal Districts region as well as the
South have high levels of awareness, the
Northeast and the Northwest regions have
very low levels of awareness with the Tribal
region being between these two extremes.
The transaction costs that result from this
lack of awareness are not just at the level
of not getting jobs, but also in terms of not
being paid the stipulated wages. In order
to address this issue it would be useful to
build on the empirical fact that within the
two northern regions with very low levels
of awareness, the district which has an
active presence of a Non Government
Organization has a relatively better
awareness.
It is recommended that a portion
of the Administrative costs of the
MGNREGS in Karnataka be used to
support advocacy Non Government
Organizations working in the
backward and low awareness districts
of the state. The NGO should be
mission driven rather than fund
driven. This support can be linked to
performance. The criteria for
performance should include
attendance at gram sabhas, the number
of job cards, and jobs created. Ideally,
each NGO should be given a small
area so as to ensure better focus.
JOB CARDS
The process of issuing job cards appears
to lack adequate scrutiny. Not only are the
number of job cards listed in some of the
regions very high, but the governemnt’s owns
process of verification has found lakhs of job
cards that have a different number but the
same name of the head of the household. Such
large numbers of job cards that may be
suspect calls for a fresh look at the very
process of issuing job cards. At the same time
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nothing must be done to reduce the extent of
decentralization of this process.
It is therefore recommended that
a separate registry be created in each
gram panchayat to issue job cards.
This body will not have as its member
any serving member of the gram
panchayat. It will have one
representative of each of the ward
sabhas in that gram panchayat. It will
be administered through an
independent non-government agency
that will create a network of gram
panchayat level registries in each
district. This gram panchayat level
registry can then issue the job cards
based on verification by the member
from each ward sabha. The
computerisation of this process at the
taluk level will help prevent the issue
of second cards to the same household.
It would also help spot members of
the registry from each ward sabha
who are prone to issue second cards
to the same household.
PLACE OF THE CHRONIC POOR IN
THE SCHEME
Given the nature of the MGNREGS,
the chronic poor should be the primary
beneficiaries of the scheme; a greater
proportion of the chronic poor should get
jobs under the scheme than is the case
with other sections of rural society. This
is however true only of the Northeast. And
since this region has very low levels of
implementat ion of  the Scheme the
significance of this result is limited. In
the other four regions the proportion of
beneficiaries among the chronic poor is
less than this proportion among others.
Indeed, in the Tribal region the proportion
among the chronic poor is less than half
the proportion among others. The current
methods of targeting the very poor are
not always effective. Poor land owners
have the benefit of using the MGNREGS
wage to work on their own land, but this
is not available to the poorest who are
typically landless. Using the BPL card
dilutes the benefits to the poorest as this
card is also available to others who may
be poor but are not the poorest. Our
survey also suggests that using the BPL
card as a basis for targeting the poor does
not guarantee that all the poor will be
covered.
On the basis of previous
experience projects should be
identified that tend to employ the
chronic poor. Such projects should be
given priority.
DIFFERENTLY ABLED
Standardised piece work criteria can
discriminate against the old, and other
differently abled workers. This dilutes the
guarantee of work.
It is therefore proposed that a
separate list of activities be notified
taking into account the abilities of
individuals. Differently abled
individuals can then be given work
in line with their abilities.
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CONVERGENCE AND THE
AVAILABILITY OF JOBS
The fact that workers are often sent
back and asked to return with a group of at
least ten workers suggests that jobs are not
immediately available when a worker wants
them. As unemployment allowances are not
usually paid in Karnataka this lack of jobs
is a critical impediment to the functioning
of the MGNREGS. A solution that is often
suggested is to seek convergence with other
government schemes. All the departments
that have projects identified in a particular
gram panchayat could be asked to state their
demand for labour in advance. Depending
on the number of workers asking for work,
the gram panchayat secretary could inform
the department at the beginning of each week
about the availability of labour for that
week. While this approach will improve the
availability of jobs, it runs two risks. First,
additional MGNREGS funds could go into
meeting targets that are already provided
for. Second, more popular schemes could
crowd out the funds needed to remove the
bottlenecks to development, particularly in
dry land areas.
It is therefore recommended that
the government, based on inputs from
decentralized institutions, first
identify the bottlenecks to
development in each taluk in the state.
It can then list the other state and
central schemes that are best suited
to remove these bottlenecks. These
schemes can then provide to the local
gram panchayats their weekly
requirements of labour. And the gram
panchayat secretary should inform
those carrying out the project locally
about the availability of MGNREGS
workers each week. Schemes that use
MGNREGS labour should have their
targets suitably raised.
WORKING ON OWN LAND
The MGNREGS allows the
underprivileged to work on their own land.
This benefit is granted to specific groups
including the beneficiaries of land reforms.
This acts as a labour subsidy for these land
owners.  In the most developed region of
rural Karnataka – the Malnad and Coastal
Districts region – this number is not small.
And a large part of this work goes into
horticulture. In many cases this could result
in MGNREGS funds being used where the
farmers would have been able to use their
own labour or even hire labour. Such a
subsidy would only be justified on two
grounds: one it helps the very poor and it
contributes to food production.
It is therefore recommended that
the option of working on their own
farms only be given to those growing
food crops. The very poor can be
exempted from this condition.
WORK ON PRIVATE LAND WITH
PUBLIC BENEFIT
A major area of concern in Indian
agriculture has been dry land farming. The
technologies for dry land farming are
designed for the entire watershed. A farm
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pond can be built at the lowest point in the
watershed, thereby improving the
availability of water to areas around it. This
process faces two important bottlenecks. The
pond could be on the private land of one
farmer while the benefit would be to others.
This would require a mechanism whereby
the farmer whose land becomes a farm pond
is compensated by the others. The second
bottleneck is that no single farmer would
find it viable to make the investment for the
entire watershed. The resources available
under the MGNREGS could be used to fill
in this viability gap.
It is therefore recommended that
the MGNREGS allows work on private
land for specific watershed projects,
such as the building of a farm pond.
This must however only be allowed
when there is a clear lease mechanism
whereby a farmer whose land is taken
for such an asset  is compensated by
the others in that watershed. It is also
essential that all the members of the
watershed opt for such a scheme.
SHELF OF PROJECTS
In theory the MGNREGS has a well
laid out procedure to marry the expertise
available at the district and taluk levels with
the requirements of the gram panchayat when
determining the shelf of projects. The line
departments are expected to suggest projects
that the gram panchayat choose from, based
on their needs. In practice, what happens is
that the gram panchayat typically comes up
with a set of projects and the line department
officials only decide whether it is feasible.
Taluk officials act as the clearing house,
deciding whether the projects are among
those that are permissible. As the list of
permissible projects is broad and can be
interpreted even more broadly, a wide range
of projects can go through. This process does
not pay much attention to the effectiveness
of individual projects in removing the local
bottlenecks to development.
It is therefore recommended that
after the government has worked out
the list of bottlenecks for the
development of each predominantly
rural taluk in the state, the line
departments can work out the specific
projects required to remove the
bottlenecks. The gram panchayat can
then be told that at least one in every
two projects should be from this
sharply focused list.
LIST OF PERMISSIBLE PROJECTS
In determining the list of permissible
projects there are two contradictory
pressures. A narrow list can lead to projects
that are critical to a specific area not being
included. A very broad list on the other hand
could result in the emphasis on key areas
being diluted. A part of this conflict is met
by the previous recommendation of a
smaller, sharply focused list of specific
projects required to remove bottlenecks. The
permissible list would then be relevant only
for the remaining projects. But this list too
would benefit from taking into account the
specificities of each local region.
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It is therefore recommended that
the larger list of permissible projects
is also made taluk specific. Thus each
taluk would have two lists: one of the
specific projects required to remove
bottlenecks, and another larger list
of permissible projects that are locally
relevant.
AGRICULTURE
The effect of the MGNREGS on
agriculture is an issue that sometimes raises
deep concerns. We have seen that concerns
of a direct adverse impact on agriculture in
the various regions of Karnataka, by
drawing workers away from agriculture, are
grossly exaggerated. But even the indirect
effects of the scheme should be positive in
the long run.  Ideally the projects under the
Scheme should improve the quality of land
to such an extent that the farmers would be
able to pay attractive wages. For this to
happen the projects would have to have a
direct impact on the productivity of land.
The projects under the Scheme would be
particularly useful if they generate
investments that individual farmers do not
find viable. For example, a project may be
beneficial to a group of farmers, but each
one of them may not find it viable to invest
in it. To the extent that it improves the overall
quality of resources in agriculture, it would
be a viable MGNREGS project.
It is therefore recommended that
specific land improvement projects
covering the land of more than one
farmer be given top priority,
especially in dry land areas. They
could be included in the list of
projects that would remove
bottlenecks to development.
NON-LABOUR BENEFICIARIES
The beneficiaries of the MGNREGS
are primarily the labour employed in the
projects, but the individuals benefiting from
the projects typically gain much more.
There is a possibility of some projects
benefiting just a few at great expense. It is
also possible that the same households
benefit repeatedly from MGNREGS
projects. Our qualitative survey came up
with examples of both. This leads to a
distortion in the distribution of the benefits
of the projects under the Scheme.
It is therefore recommended that
the gram panchayat maintains a
record of the number of households
benefiting for every Rs 10,000 spent
on a project under the MGNREGS. It
should distinguish between the direct
beneficiaries of the scheme, such as
those who benefit from the irrigation
provided by a well, and the indirect
beneficiaries such as those benefiting
from forestry. A work having only
indirect benefits would have to have
many more beneficiaries, say, three
times the beneficiaries of a competing
work with direct beneficiaries. When
clearing a project the Taluk Panchayat
must try to ensure that the number of
households benefiting from money
spent on a project is high, and the
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number of repeated beneficiaries from
MGNREGS projects is low.
DEMAND FOR WORK
The current process of assessing the
labour budget is quite arbitrary. It varies
across regions, ranging from assuming a
certain number of days per job card to
projections based on the previous year’s
performance. These arbitrary methods are
even more misleading as the workers are
often sent back to return in a larger group,
so that those who do not return tend to
be ignored. This is further distorted by
the fact that workers who register for work
are rarely given an acknowledgement slip.
In order for the MGNREGS to be true to
the spirit of guaranteeing work to every
worker, it is necessary to ensure that the
demand for work is recorded whenever it
exists. Ideally, this would be done by
finding out from every household with a
job card, their requirements of labour for
the week. This information collected over
a year would provide a better basis to
project the demand for work in the next
year. This measure could also be adjusted
to take into account factors l ike a
drought.
It is therefore recommended that
15 person days of MGNREGS labour
per month in each gram panchayat
be devoted to finding out the weekly
labour demand from each household.
This exercise will have the added
benefit of increasing awareness under
the Scheme. The individual playing
this role could also help the
Ombudsperson keep track of the
working of the Scheme. The record of
the demand for work will also provide
an authentic account of not just the
magnitude of the demand but also its
seasonality.
DELAY IN PAYMENTS
A major reason cited for the delay in
payments across regions is the measurement
of work done. The line department officials
making these measurements have a number
of responsibilities covering more than one
gram panchayat. To expect them to make
the measurements more promptly would
therefore be unrealistic. It may be more
effective to have the measurements taken
locally. This does raise the possibility of error,
or worse. But other methods could be used
to check wrong doing.
It is therefore recommended that
the measurement of work done be
carried out at the gram panchayat
level. The line department officials
could carry out random surprise
checks to find out the accuracy of these
measurements. Disciplinary action
could be taken against the gram
panchayat officials if the error is more
than 10 percent.
It is also recommended that an
easily accessible mechanism should
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SOCIAL AUDIT
The social audit is one of the main
features of the MGNREGS. It allows for
popular monitoring of the working of the
Scheme. Across Karnataka the social
audits are held regularly, but their very
purpose is defeated by the extremely low
levels of popular interest. For this system
to work to any degree it is essential that
the attendance at social audit gram sabhas
improves.
It is therefore recommended that
if an NGO is appointed in a district
for awareness of the MGNREGS and
another individual given 15 person
days of MGNREGS work to collect
labour demand information, the social
audit coordinator must work in close
coordination with them to improve
the attendance at the social audit
gram sabhas.
MONITORING
The monitoring of the MGNREGS
focuses primarily on the processes of the
Scheme. This has the advantage of being
able to find out if each individual is doing
his or her job. But this approach is not
without its limitations. We have already seen
that it can cause delays. It also sometimes
leads to a focus on steps in the process rather
than the outcomes. When seen in terms of
individual steps the number of job cards can
be taken as an indicator of the working of
the MGNREGS. This figure does not
however take into account the households
that have job cards but have never had any
of its individual members working in the
MGNREGS. And these figures are not small.
Over a third of the households with job cards
in the Northwest region and around a fifth
of the households with job cards in other
regions have not had even a single day’s
work under the MGNREGS. Similarly, the
amount spent on a project or the number of
projects can also be misleading without
taking into account at least the number of
beneficiaries from each project and some
estimate, howsoever rudimentary, of the
effect of the project.
It is therefore recommended that
the monitoring of the Scheme be done
not only in terms of the process but
also in terms of outcomes. The
outcomes in terms of jobs would be
the number of households that have
gained employment in the scheme.
And the outcomes in terms of the
assets created would include the
number of beneficiaries of those assets
as well as some technical indicator
of the quality of that asset.
QUALITY OF INFORMATION
One issue that came up repeatedly
during the study was the discrepancies
between the information available on the
MIS and that thrown up by our study. The
data on the MIS was in stark contrast to
the data that emerged from our quantitative
survey, especially in the two northern
regions. This difference was too large to be
attributed to sampling error. What is more,
following up on a specific project that was
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being carried out, the facts on the ground
were in sharp contrast to the information
available on the MIS. Since it was one of
our terms of reference to find out if there
was a difference between the data input in
the gram panchayat and the data that
emerged on the website, we carried out
random checks of the two. None of these
checks threw up any difference between
what was being input in the gram
panchayat and what was on the website.
The source of the error then had to be the
difference between what was recorded on
the ground and the input into the MIS. The
possibility of differences at this stage was
heightened by the fact that the common
practice was to carry out the entire work
using only a notebook, and entering the
information into the computer after the
work was completed. This created the
potential for both accidental and deliberate
errors.
It is therefore recommended that
a detailed review be carried out of
the procedures being followed at the
gram panchayat level to record the
work under the MGNREGS on the
official website.
FACILITIES FOR LABOUR
Very few facilities for labour are
available at the worksites. Workers are often
expected to even bring their own water.
It is therefore recommended that
each Gram Panchayat have a pedal-
driven three-wheeler designed to
provide drinking water, medical aid
for emergencies, and if possible, a
temporary shade that can be easily
set up and dismantled. The work of
the driver of the pedal-driven three-
wheeler should be treated as
MGNREGS work.
THE RECOMMENDATIONS
The following is the list of
recommendations:
1. A portion of the Administrative costs
of the MGNREGS in Karnataka
should be used to support advocacy
Non Government Organizations
working in the backward and low
awareness districts of the state. The
NGO should be mission driven rather
than fund driven. This support can be
linked to performance. The criteria for
performance should include attendance
at gram sabhas, the number of job
cards, and jobs created. Ideally, each
NGO should be given a small area so
as to ensure better focus.
2. A separate registry must be created in
each gram panchayat to issue job cards.
This body will not have as its member
any serving member of the gram
panchayat. It will have one
representative of each of the ward
sabhas in that gram panchayat. It will
be administered through an independent
non-government agency that will create
a network of gram panchayat level
registries in each district. This gram
panchayat level registry can then issue
the job cards based on verification by
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the member from each ward sabha. The
computerisation of this process at the
taluk level will help prevent the issue
of second cards to the same household.
It would also help spot members of the
registry from each ward sabha who are
prone to issue second cards to the same
household.
3. On the basis of previous experience
projects should be identified that tend
to employ the chronic poor. Such
projects should be given priority.
4. A separate list of activities should be
notified taking into account the
abilities of individuals. Differently
abled individuals can then be given
work in line with their abilities.
5. The state government, based on inputs
from decentralized institutions, should
first identify the bottlenecks to
development in each taluk in the state.
It can then list the other state and
central schemes that are best suited to
remove these bottlenecks. These
schemes can then provide to the local
gram panchayats their weekly
requirements of labour. And the gram
panchayat secretary should inform
those carrying out the project locally
about the availability of MGNREGS
workers each week. Schemes that use
MGNREGS labour should have their
targets suitably raised.
6. The option of working on their own
farms must only be given to those
growing food crops. The very poor can
be exempted from this condition.
7. The MGNREGS should allow work on
private land for specific watershed
projects, such as the building of a farm
pond. This must however only be
allowed when there is a clear lease
mechanism whereby a farmer whose
land is taken for such an asset  is
compensated by the others in that
watershed. It is also essential that all
the members of the watershed opt for
such a scheme.
8. After the government has worked out
the list of bottlenecks for the
development of each predominantly
rural taluk in the state, the line
departments can work out the specific
projects required to remove the
bottlenecks. The gram panchayat can
then be told that at least one in every
two projects should be from this
sharply focused list.
9. The larger list of permissible projects
should also be made taluk specific.
Thus each taluk would have two lists:
one of the specific projects required to
remove bottlenecks, and another larger
list of permissible projects that are
locally relevant.
10. Specific land improvement projects
covering the land of more than one
farmer should be given top priority,
especially in dry land areas. They
could be included in the list of projects
that would remove bottlenecks to
development.
11. The gram panchayat must maintain a
record of the number of households
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benefiting for every Rs 10,000 spent
on a project under the MGNREGS. It
should distinguish between the direct
beneficiaries of the scheme, such as
those who benefit from the irrigation
provided by a well, and the indirect
beneficiaries such as those benefiting
from forestry. A work having only
indirect benefits would have to have
many more beneficiaries, say, three
times the beneficiaries of a competing
work with direct beneficiaries. When
clearing a project the taluk panchayat
must try to ensure that the number of
households benefiting from money
spent on a project is high, and the
number of repeated beneficiaries from
MGNREGS projects is low.
12. Fifteen person days of MGNREGS
labour per month in each gram
panchayat must be devoted to finding
out the weekly labour demand from
each household. This exercise will have
the added benefit of increasing
awareness under the Scheme. The
individual playing this role could also
help the Ombudsperson keep track of
the working of the Scheme. The record
of the demand for work will also
provide an authentic account of not just
the magnitude of the demand but also
its seasonality.
13. In order to reduce delays in payments
the measurement of work done should
be carried out at the gram panchayat
level. The line department officials
could carry out random surprise checks
to find out the accuracy of these
measurements. Disciplinary action
could be taken against the gram
panchayat officials if the error is more
than 10 percent. It is also
recommended that an easily accessible
mechanism should be set up to provide
compensation for delays in payment.
14. If an NGO is appointed in a district
for awareness of the MGNREGS and
another individual given 15 person
days of MGNREGS work to collect
labour demand information, the social
audit coordinator must work in close
coordination with them to improve the
attendance at the social audit gram
sabhas.
15. The monitoring of the Scheme must be
done not only in terms of the process
but also in terms of outcomes. The
outcomes in terms of jobs would be the
number of households that have gained
employment in the scheme. And the
outcomes in terms of the assets created
would include the number of
beneficiaries of those assets as well as
some technical indicator of the quality
of that asset.
16. A detailed review must be carried out
of the procedures being followed at the
gram panchayat level to record the
work under the MGNREGS on the
official website.
17. In order to improve facilities at work
sites, each gram panchayat must be
given a pedal-driven three-wheeler
designed to provide drinking water,
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medical aid for emergencies, and if
possible, a temporary shade that can
be easily set up and dismantled. The
work of the driver of the pedal-driven
three-wheeler should be treated as
MGNREGS work.
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Sl. Region Distr ict Taluk Gram Village
No. panchayat
1 Northeast Bidar Aurad Koutha -B Koudgaon
2 Northeast Bidar Aurad Koutha -B Koutha K
3 Northeast Bijapur Bijapur Baratagi Gugadaddi
4 Northeast Bijapur Bijapur Baratagi Inganal
5 Northwest Haveri Byadgi Keravadi Chinnikatti
6 Northwest Haveri Byadgi Keravadi Kalagonda
7 Northwest Davanagere Davanagere Belavanur Chandrana-
halli
8 Northwest Davanagere Davanagere Belavanur Turchaghatta
9 Tribal Raichur Sindhnur Udabal Kyathanhatti
10 Tribal Raichur Sindhnur Udabal Sunkanur
11 Tribal Chitradurga Molakalmuru Hanagal Bommalinga-
nahalli
12 Tribal Chitradurga Molakalmuru Hanagal Hanagal
13 Malnad Dakshina Sulya Balpa Balpa
Kannada
14 Malnad Dakshina Sulya Balpa Kenya
Kannada
15 Malnad Shimoga Hosnagara Haridravathi Alagerimandri
16 Malnad Shimoga Hosnagara Haridravathi Devarahonne-
koppa
17 Malnad Shimoga Hosnagara Haridravathi H. Hunasavalli
18 Malnad Shimoga Hosnagara Haridravathi Heelagodu
19 South Chamarajanagar Yelandur Yeriyooru Ganaganurun-
agara
20 South Chamarajanagar Yelandur Yeriyooru Yariyuru
21 South Ramanagara Channapatna Chakkere Govindahalli
22 South Ramanagara Channapatna Chakkere Hottigana
Hosahalli
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APPENDIX 2: CALCULATING THE MULTIPLIER
As we noted in footnote 1 of Chapter 4, the multiplier is based on the fact that money spent is income
in the hands of the receiver of the money. The recipient will save some of this income and spend the
rest. What she spends is once again income for the new recipient, who will save some of it and spend
the rest. And so on. Thus the overall impact of every rupee earned takes the form of a geometric
progression
1+c+c2+c3+ . . . +cn + . . . = 1
1 - c
Where c = marginal propensity to consume
In the case of MGNREGS wages the money goes to the poor who typically consume a greater proportion
of their income. Since the succeeding rounds of income and expenditure will not be confined to the
poor, the propensity to consume in later rounds will be less. If we were to treat the propensity to
consume in later rounds as the same as that of MGNREGS earnings, we would be overestimating the
multiplier. Thus for the succeeding rounds we would be better off going by the overall propensity to
consume in the economy. The geometric progression then becomes
1+c+cd+c(d)2+ . . . +c(d)n + . . . = 1+ c
1 - d
Where d = marginal propensity to consume for the economy as a whole. Since this information is not
easily available the estimate of d used in the calculation is derived from the Quick Estimates of the
gross domestic savings rate for 2009-10 given in the Economic Survey 2010-11, p A 10.
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